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DEVELOPING INDUSTRIAL CITIZENSHIP
A CHALLENGE FOR CANADA'S
SECOND CENTURY
H. W. ARTHURS
Toronto
1. The Concept of Industrial Citizenship .

For the early years of Canada's first century, our industrial relations policy seemed to verify Maine's premise that progress is
represented by the evolution from status to contract. By about
1900, a colony whose labour force included indentured servants
and coolie labour, habitants and, tenant farmers, had become almost entirely a nation of free workers and agricultural entrepreneurs. No longer bound to master or landlord by criminal sanctions
or seigneurial obligations, the Canadian wage earner was free to
sell his labour, or the fruits of his labour, on the open market .
The price at which he would sell was, of course, subject to negotiation, but in law he was free to contract on almost any terms he
wished .
Yet, almost unnoticed, we may have arrived at the beginning
of our second century with precisely the opposite premise enshrined as national policy. Today the Canadian worker lives in
creasingly in a world of rights and duties created not by his individual contractual act, but by a process of public and private
legislation. Members of the industrial community enjoy these
rights and duties solely by virtue of their membership in that
community. In effect there is emerging a new status-that of
"industrial citizen"=whose juridical attributes may be analogized
to those of citizenship generally. The purpose of this article is to
trace the evolution of industrial citizenship and to speculate about
its future : who are industrial citizens? to what extent do they enjoy freedoms and responsibilities in their relationships with government, with unions and management, with each other? what juridical institutions exist to protect the benefits of industrial citizenship
and to enforce its burdens?
°`H. W. Arthurs, of Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto.
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®f course, the industrial community does not exist in a vacuum:
it is a state within a state. Thus, there are areas where the attributes of industrial citizenship overlap with or parallel those of
national citizenship, and areas where the two converge or diverge.
Moreover, the worker, like .the citizen-at-large, is not entirely the
prisoner of the system . He obviously retains the right to accept
or renounce his status and to participate, . at least indirectly, in
political processes which affect its quality, although he can seldom
bargain on his own behalf for his individual vision of the good
life . Finally, the retreat of Canadians from contractual freedom
to the more secure advantages of status is by- no means confined
to the industrial worker : shippers of goods are the beneficiaries
of regulated rates ; purchasers of insurance are covered by statutory forms of policies ; investors are protected against the most
extreme perils of caveat emptor by legislation compelling truthful disclosure on the securities market ; farmers sell their crops
through government marketing boards ; consumers are beginning
to win the benefits of fair credit terms and guarantees against
fraud. The worker, shipper, insured, investor, farmer or consumer
gains certain advantages, not because he has contracted for them,
but because of his status as a member of a group, or his role in
a transaction . Conversely, he may not bargain away these advantages, unless at the same time he forsakes the group or relinquishes the transaction .
A critical threshold issue is to identify those who enjoy industrial citizenship . Because labour legislation typically confers
rights upon "employees", it is the persons so described who are
"industrial citizens". This definition, of course, immediately raises
a theme which will occur throughout this article : is the industrial
community to be permitted to create a distinctive system of jurisprudence, or must it faithfully reflect traditional legal concepts,
doctrines, and procedures? In the particular context, the question
is whether common law tests for the existence of an "employeremployee" or "master-servant" relationship are to prevail over
distinctive industrial relations tests. Broadly speaking, the common. law views employment as the product of contractual arrangements ("who has the right to control?"), while in industrial relations terms, employment is a status flowing from a relationship
of economic dependence . The importance of this definitional
exercise is that an employer might use his superior bargaining
position to destroy "citizenship" rights, if employment were based
on contract rather than status .
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Without reviewing the extensive jurisprudence developed by
Canadian courts and boards on this question,' it is clear that
today we are well on the way to accepting the status test. For
example, Ontario has adopted a "four-fold test" to define the
coverage of the Labour Relations Act. Employee status is determined by inquiring whether the putative employee controls the
performance of his work, owns his own tools, and has the chance
of gain or risk of loss in the situation; an affirmative answer will
identify the individual as an independent contractor, a negative
answer as an employee' Significantly, tlie labour boatd seeks its
answer in the actual facts of the relationship, and has held that
persons may znjoy the status of employees even though they have
signed contracts in which they accept the designation of "independent contractor" .'
Important developments in the law of industrial relations are
based on the concept that employment is a status with distinctive
rights and duties . A procedural example illustrates the significance
of the eclipse of contract and of the rise of the "citizenship" concept.
For over -a century, a distinctive characteristic of the employment contract was that it could not be specifically enforced, although damages might be sought in the event of breach .' An
employer could not force an employee to work, nor could he be
forced to continue to employ him. A fortiori, a court would never
compel either an employer or an employee to enter into such a
contract. So far have we lost our inhibitions about legal intervention into this most personal of contracts that today labour relations boards, with express legislative authority,' and arbitrators,
with implied authority,' do force employers to continue to employ
persons who have been wrongfully discharged. More startling yet,
employers have been required to hire employees to whom they
have wrongfully denied employment .' This rejection of traditional
remedial techniques in employment has not been solely legislative,
nor has it operated solely for the benefit of workers. In at least
, See, generally, Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor : A Study of the
Legal Problems of Countervailing Power (1965), 16 U .T.L.7 . 89 .
2 Canada Bread Co . Ltd., [1961] C .C.H . L .L.R . P .16,223 (O .L .R.B .)
'Cima Ltd., [1963] May Mthly . Rep . 100 (O.L.R .B .) .
"Lunzley v . Wagner (1852), 42 E .R. 687 ; Warner Bros. v. Nelson,
[19371 1 K .B . 209 .
' See, e .g ., Labour Relations
Act, R .S.O ., 1960, c. 202, s . 65 .
s See Levinson, Discharge
and Discipline in Ontario (2nd ed ., 1964) ;
P. . v . Arthurs, ex . p. Port Arthur Shipbuilding, [1967] 2 O .R. 49 (C .A .) .
'Numilk Co . Ltd . (1962), 62 C.L.L.C. P .16,237 (O.L .R.11.) .
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two provinces,' courts have issued injunctions which require illegally striking employees to return to work, on the theory that
they were thereby enforcing a "negative covenant" against strikes.
As another court more frankly remarked in rejecting the traditional attitude of equity towards enforcement of personal service
contracts, "the complexity of labour-management relations in a
highly industrialized civilization were presumably not even thought
of" a century ago when the rule against enforcement of affirmative promises to perform services first emerged.'
Undoubtedly, this procedural revolution reflects new substantive, legal values : what are being protected are not contractual
rights but public policies . These policies would have been frus
trated if new remedies had not been devised to protect workers
against discrimination and employers against illegal strikes. Moreover the new remedies are made possible because the nature of
the employment relationship itself has changed. Modern industrial workers are typically not bound by individual contracts of
personal service; they are hired "at-will", and either worker or
employer is free to terminate the relationship subject only to the
restrictions imposed by public or private legislation . Finally, the
changing nature of work helps to make the new remedies possible; jobs are more routine, workers are more nearly interchangeable, and "personal" contact between a large corporate employer and its employees is virtually non-existent . Thus, the traditional grounds for refusing to enforce the employment contract
-the difficulty of supervising performance and the avoidance of
personal animosity between worker and employer-have ceased
to exist. Naturally, like any other unsuccessful litigant, a worker
or employer affected by these new remedies may continue to be
resentful, but the functional problems of securing his compliance
with the order are considerably less formidable than they were .
With these changes in the dynamic of employment and in its
legal implications, it would seem that through the use of the new
remedies, courts, labour boards, and arbitrators are really creating,
'Re Dominion Bridge, [19591 C .C.H . L.L.R . P.15,244 (B .C .S .C .), rev'd .
(1960), 20 D .L .R . (2d) 621 (B .C .C.A.) ; Gulf Island Navigation v. S.I .U .
(1959), 18 D .L .R. (2d) 216 (B .C .S .C .) ; Inspiration Mining v. I .U .O .E.,
Local 115 (1962), 36 D .L.R . (2d) 363 (B .C.S.C .) ; Antonsen v. United
Fishermen (1963), 64 C.L .L .C . P.15,497 (B .C .S .C.) ; Kelly Douglas v.
Bakery Workers, Local 468 (1965), 48 D.L.R . (2d) 520 (B .C.S.C .) ;
Winnipeg Builders Exchange v . Operative Plasterers (1965), 48 D .L.R .
(2d) 173 (Man . C .A .) ; Winnipeg Builders Exchange v. I.B.E.W. (1966),
57 D .L .R. (2d) 141 (Man . C .A .), aff'd. by S .C.C., Oct. 3rd, 1967, unreported .
s
Winnipeg Builders Exchange v . I .B .E.W., ibid., at p . 157 .
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restoring, and protecting a status relationship, rather than a contractual one.
Once this fact gradually emerges, the need to clearly articulate
the basis of relief becomes more urgent . No doubt, the present
fiction'' that the courts are merely enforcing "negative convenants"
against striking will be abandoned, and either courts or some
specialized tribunal will be given a broad legislative mandate to
issue any remedial order necessary to effectuate statutory policy ."
Similarly, the very definition of employment will be recast to more
precisely reflect what it has already become-a legal conclusion
flowing from economic facts. The present definition, the "fourfold" test referred to above, is not even found in a statute, but
has been borrowed unceremoniously, and for no good reason,
from another common law context. Any new definition probably
should confer employee status, or industrial citizenship, on any
person who is obliged to sell his services in a market in which he
is economically dependent on a single purchaser. Under such a
definition the advantages of industrial citizenship would be extended not only to those generally termed "`employees", but also
to many other economically vulnerable groups-self-employed
truck-owners and taxi-cab operators, fisherman and service-station
lessees, who might be described as "dependent contractors" .' -2
These groups could then be insulated both against superior bargaining power (through collective action) and against economic
insecurity (through social welfare legislation designed to protect
"employees") .
The concept of the employee as an industrial citizen, however,
did not proceed in orderly fashion from an articulated definition,
to which rights and duties, in due course, were deliberately ap
pended . Obviously, the concept is an attempt to rationalize and
to draw together isolated developments which only in historical
perspective can be seen to have produced "industrial citizenship" .
By exploring these developments, it is hoped, at least some relationship between them may be perceived, where formerly there
was only "a wilderness of single instances" . Perhaps, as well,
some predominant currents can be charted so that the drift of
io E .g. Winnipeg Builders Exchange v . Operative Plasterers, supra, footnote 8; Arthurs, The Right to Strike in Ontario and the Common Law
Provinces of Canada, in 1966 Proceedings, U. of Ottawa 4th International
Symposium on Comparative Law 187, at p. 199 et seq .
" Cf. Labour Relations Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c. 202, s. 65 ; Trade Union
Act, R.S .S., 1965, c. 287, s. 5(e) ; Labour Relations Act, R.S.B .C ., 1960,
c. 205, s. 7(4),
12
Arthurs, op . cit., footnote 1 .
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future decisions and statutes can be predicted and evaluated.
Finally, the time may arrive for codification, for adoption of a
charter of industrial citizenship .
11. The Protection of Industrial Citizenship .
1 . Protection Against State Action .

Critical to the development of industrial citizenship was the
removal of criminal restraints on individual and group action by
workers. Until the 1870's, breach of an employment contract was
a criminal offence;" collective action such as a strike was similarly
stigmatized as a criminal conspiracy ;" even peaceful picketing
was of dubious legality until a proviso to the Criminal Code
specifically authorized it ." Until well into the twentieth century
unions laboured under the stigma of the restraint of trade doctrine
which operated as a form of outlawry to deny them access to the
civil courts ." The removal of these restraints in fact constituted
an affirmative beginning to the concept of industrial citizenship, by
establishing in the industrial context basic freedoms enjoyed elsewhere : freedom of contract, subject only to normal civil sanctions; freedom of association and group action for better working
conditions ; freedom of speech and assembly for labour objectives
on the picket line, at least so long as violence and obstruction
were avoided.
y 1900, then, the law no longer could be said to impose
greater restraints on industrial workers than existed in the general
community. However, the operation of general legal principles
often seemed to have a peculiarly one-sided impact in the context
of labour relations .
ights of private property and contract, zealously guarded
by the law, were of minor importance to those who had no such
property, and whose contracts were thrust upon them by superior
economic strength. Particularly through the development of tort
"Master and Servant Act, C .S .U.C ., 1859, c . 75; repealed by S.C .,
1877, c. 35 ; see now Criminal Code, S .C ., 1953-54, c . 51, s . 365 .
"For an account of the English criminal legislation relating to trade
unions, its use in Canada following a printers' strike in 1871, and its subsequent amendment by the Trade Unions Act, S .C ., 1872, c. 30, and the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, S .C ., 1872, c. 31, see Carrothers, Collective
Bargaining Law in Canada (1965), c . 2. See now Criminal Code, ibid., ss .
408-410 .
"The "peaceful picketing" proviso was added by S .C., 1876, c . 37,
omitted in the 1892 consolidation of the Criminal Code, and restored by
S.C., 1934, c . 47. See now Criminal Code, ibid ., s. 366(2) .
"See Chase v. Starr, [1923] 4 D.L.R . 103 (Man . C .A.), aflf'd. [1924]
S.C .R. 495.
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doctrines, the courts began to inhibit the freedom of action which
the repeal of criminal sanctions had permitted . Resentment against
this judicial regulation of labour activity produced political pressures for change . English law," and to some extent Canadian
law," reflected these pressures in legislation which conferred the
right on those engaged in industrial warfare to commit what would
otherwise be torts, in the special context of a "trade dispute" . In
retrospect, this approach was unfortunate insofar as it appeared
to put unionists "above the law". As recent developments in both
countries have shown, the courts are unsympathetic to any attempt by those who are bound by the general law to ignore it
when they deem their interests to be adversely affected ."
The real problem was, of course, not whether industrial combatants should be privileged to break the law, but rather which of
two opposed interests was to be preferred in a given situation. For
example, was tfe economic interest of the employer in the uninterrupted operation of his business to be preferred over the
economic interest of employees, striking to secure higher wages?
Was the interest of potential customers in unimpeded access to
struck premises greater than the interest of picketers in congregating at the focal point of a labour dispute? These, of course,
are not easy problems, and even today Canadian law has barely
begun to grapple with some of them. However, the earliest Canadian and English legislation did not speak directly to these policy
choices . It merely excused tortfeasors so long as the occasion for
wrongdoing was a trade dispute . Only with the development of a
distinctive system of labour legislation did we begin to consciously
establish any order of priorities amongst competing social values
in labour relations.
The first step in the evolution of an affirmative Canadian
labour policy was the 1907 Industrial Disputes Investigation Act."
Its purpose was to avoid the social waste of strikes by a mech
anism of conciliation, thereby enshrining industrial peace as an
important goal. However, implicit in the Act was recognition that
industrial relations was an area of social conflict which could not
be regulated by traditional legal techniques. Conciliation was required, rather than adjudication. Having accepted the basic premise
l' See Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47 .
1$ Trade-Unions Act, S.B .C ., 1902, c. 66, s. 3, repealed by S.B .C ., 1959 .
c. 90 .
"See, Rookes v. Barnard, [19641 1 All E.R. 367 (H.L .) ; International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 213 v. Therien, [19601 S .C .R. 265 .
20
R.S.C . . 1907, c. 20.
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that the industrial community possessed its own needs and norms,
the next step was to articulate those norms and to fashion machinery for their enforcement.
Beginning in the mid-1930's, our provincial and federal legislators undertook this task." Labour relations acts proclaimed the
freedom of industrial citizens to associate in unions and protected
this freedom by both penal and administrative procedures ." Reasonable freedom of economic action was ensured, including the
right to strike, so that through collective bargaining employees
could participate in the process of setting their wages and working
conditions. The device of the certification vote ensured democratic
majority rule on the issue of union representation, and displaced
the former rule of power ." Free speech, in the context of the
certification vote, was protected by legislation," and in the context of picketing, by several libertarian judicial pronouncements ."
The obvious thrust of these legal developments was to secure "the
policy of collective bargaining as a road to industrial peace"."
However, this road has proved to be rocky. Now we have
entered a phase where the operation and extension of these freedoms have created conflicts within and beyond the industrial com
munity. For example, freedom of association is seen to collide
with freedom to abstain from association . Freedom of economic
action in industrial warfare has produced casualties amongst noncombatants and neutrals. Yet, on balance, the labour relations
acts remain a "bill of rights" which secure an ordered liberty in industry. Only in cases of serious threats to public health and safety,
or community crises, have we invoked a "clear and present danger"
tést to justify compulsory mediation and arbitration, and to suspend freedom of action.Z7
This is not to say that civil liberties in industrial relations are
See Carrothers, op. cit., footnote 14, pp. 43-60 .
The two most important legislative models were the Collective Bargaining Act, S.O., 1943, c. 4, and 1944 federal Wartime Labour Relations
Regulations, P .C.1003 .
"See e .g . Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 202, ss. 5, 7; Smith
Bros . Construction v. Jones, [1955] O.R. 362.
"See e.g. Labour Relations Act, ibid., s. 48; and see Adell, Employer
"Free Speech" in the United States and Canada (1966) .
11 R . v . Baldassari, [1931] O.R. 169 ; Canada Dairies v . Seggie, [1940]
4 D.L.R. 725 (Ont. H.C.) ; Williams v . Aristocratic Restaurants, [1951]
S.C.R.
762 .
" Sask.,
L.R .B . v . John East Iron Works, [1949] A.C. 134, at p. 150,
per Lord Simonds .
27 See e .g.
Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, S.O., 1965, c. 48 ;
Alberta Labour Act, R.S.A., 1955, c. 167 ; Maintenance of Railway Operations Act, S.C., 1966, c. 50.
21
2a
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always easy to define, or totally immune from attack by the state.
Legislation has been passed dissolving a union freely selected by
employees," and depriving a union of bargaining rights because
one of its officers is a Communist," or a convicted criminal," or
because it is affiliated with a body in another jurisdiction ." Statutes have forbidden political activity by a union regardless of
the desires of a majority of its members," and have replaced the
elected officers of a union with government-appointed trustees.`In each case, the legislation was attacked as an unwarranted interference with freedom of association, and defended on the basis
that some higher community value was being served, or that individual employees were being protected against group oppression .
For example, dissolution of a union on somewhat spurious grounds
during the 1959 Newfoundland logging strike was obviously
prompted by governmental fear that the entire economic structure
of the province was threatened by the strike . Prohibitions against
union political activity were said to be designed to protect the
civil rights of individual members who did not support the party
favoured by the majority . That those who were accused of infringing civil liberties felt obliged to justify their position by ail
appeal to high principle underscores the importance we attach to
the rights of industrial citizenship ; this fact is more important than
the choice of values made in any particular case .
A final word must be added to this assessment of the place of
libertarian values in the regulation of industrial conflict. Freedom
of conscience, assembly, speech, and association are related, as
philosophical and constitutional concepts, to public and governmental controversies . It can be argued, with some plausibility,
that to describe the pursuit of economic self-interest by labour or
management in the vocabulary of civil liberties is to confer upon
one or the other unwarranted immunities . On this analysis, the
legitimacy o£ any regulation of labour or management must be
"The Trade Union (Emergency Provisions) Act, S.Nfld ., 1959, c. 2 .
2s Labour Relations Act, R.S .Q ., 1941, c. 162A, as amended S.Q ., 195354, c. 10 ; this section was omitted from the Labour Code, S.Q ., 1964, c.
141 .
"Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, S .Nfld., 1959, c, 1 ; amended by
S.Nfld., 1960, c. 58 ; repealed by S.Nfld., 1963, c. 82 .
11 Trade Union Act, P.E .I ., 1948, c. 38, ss . 3, 5(2) ; see Forsey, The
Prince Edward Island Trade Union Act, 1948 (1949), 26 Can. Bar Rev.
1159 .
as Labour Relations Act,
R.S.B .C., 1960, c. 205, s. 9(6), as amended by
S.B .C., 1961, c. 31, s. 5. The constitutional validity of this statute was upheld in O.C .A .W, Local 16-601 V. Imperial Oil, [19631 S.C .R . 584 ; see
comments, (1964), 3 O.H .L .J . 203; (1964), 22 U.T .Fac .L.Rev . 161 .
Maritime Transportation Unions Trustees Act, S.C ., 1963, c. 17 .
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measured by some such yardstick as equality of bargaining power,
calibrated and applied in the light of practical knowledge about
the impact of the activity in question . In part, this argument turns
on the degree to which labour-management relations, are seen to
involve simply a clash of private economic interests, rather than
the resolution of public and political questions . If the workers'
demand to earn more is put against management's desire for
profit, to describe the strike as the exercise of "freedom" is unhelpful. If, on the other hand, the strike is the economic prelude to
a long struggle for social and political power in our society, then
"freedom" is a concept that might be relevant to deciding its
propriety. However, -even given this latter view, it is possible that
we may wish to sacrifice "freedom" in favour of some other
societal value of great importance .
Very likely, the immediate future of labour law in Canada
will be in large measure concerned with limiting the rights, and
emphasizing the responsibilities, of industrial citizenship . This is
particularly true in respect of union treatment of individual employees-which, in a sense, involves better protection of citizenship rights-and in respect of economic conflicts which affect
critical community interests. In both cases, the state will undoubtedly demand a price, hitherto unsought, for the security it
has created for members of the industrial community.
2. Protection Against Employer Action .
As the state has moved from - a posture of hostility to labour,
through neutrality, to active protection of workers' rights, employer
action which interferes with those rights has been progressively
curtailed. Because the rights of industrial citizenship are premised
upon the existence of an employment relationship, particular
emphasis has naturally been placed on the creation or destruction
of the status . Discharge and refusal to hire, because of race,
colour, creed, sex," age' or union activity or affiliation" are forbidden. So, too, is the conditioning of employment upon a promise
not to exercise rights, or coercion or bribery designed to force
their abandonment. 37
Nowhere is concern for the preservation of the employment
relationship more dramatically demonstrated than in the case of
strikers . At common law, an employee who absented himself
Ontario Code of Human Rights, S .O ., 1961-62, c . 93, s . 4.
Age Discrimination Act, S .O., 1966, c . 3 .
Labour Relations Act, R .S .O ., 1960, c . 202, s. 50 (a) (c) .
"Ibid., s . 50(b)(c) .
3'
3s
ss
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from work, whether for a strike or for other purposes, was liable
to discharge . Implicit in his contract of employment was a promise
to be present on the job ; breach of this promise would in turn
relieve the employer of further performance . But the employee's
rights are no longer to be measured in contractual terms; today
public policy, accepting strikes as part of the collective bargaining
process, preserves the employment status of strikers and overrides
the employer's common law rights ." As has been noted, a contrary
rule would enable an employer to sweep aside valuablp. rights of
long-service employees if they did go on strike, and to put their
position at risk at the very moment when they most need their
economic strength to support their bargaining demands ." A projection of this present policy would lead, first, to the "vesting" of
rights which would otherwise be vulnerable to employer destruction-seniority and pensions, insurance and vacation pay. Since the
right to a pension, for example, would be "owned" from the first
day of employment, although its actual receipt is postponed, an
employer would no longer be able to threaten cancellation of
pension rights, to bring a strike to an end." Ultimately, however,
we may actually come to protect a man's "ownership" of his job,
and permit him to claim it against anyone, including a strikebreaker .
While protection of the right of employees to engage in collective bargaining is an important legal objective, it is not the only
one which may be relevant in a given situation. Ancient proprietary
rights, which emerge as modern value judgments in favour of free
enterprise and managerial efficiency, are also respected and protected by law . An important concern of labour jurisprudence has
thus been, and will continue to be, the balancing of the competing
and legitimate claims of employers and employees . As a preliminary question, of course, there is the evidentiary difficulty of
proving what interests are actually present in a given situation. For
example, the only incontrovertible fact may be that an employee
was discharged. Whether the employer was acting to frustrate the
"C.P.R. (Royal York Hotel), [1961] Sept. Mthly. Rep. 214 (O.L.R.B.) :
acquitted on prosecution, sub. nont . C.P.R . v. Zarnbr i (1961), 61 C.L.L.C.
P.15,372 (Mag. Ct .), reversed [1962] O.R. 105, aff'd. [1962] O.R . 554
(C .A.), aff'd [1962] S.C.R. 609 . See also Dresser Electric Ltd., [1967] Feb .
Mthly. Rep. 906 (O.L.R.B.) .
as
[1962] O.R., at p. 119, per McRuer C.J.H.C.
1° Cf . Trade Union Act, R.S.S., 1965, c. 287, s. 9(1) (1) ; Industrial
Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 152, s. 4(3) (b) ;
Alberta Labour Act, R.S.A ., 1955, c. 167, s. 78; Labour Relations Act,
R.S,N.B., 1952, c. 124, s. 3(2)(b) ; but see contra, R. v. Fuller, ex p. Earles
c& rtilcKee, [1967] 1 O.R. 701,
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employee's right to join a union, or to protect plant efficiency
against the employee's poor work performance, may be difficult
to prove. However, by a combination of presumption, suspicion
and conventional proof, labour boards surmount this difficulty in
reasonably acceptable fashion.' The example chosen is an easy
one, once the factual question is resolved . If the employer's motive
is shown to be improper, and the concern for plant efficiency
spurious, the employee should obviously be protected. On the
other hand, employee rights may be frustrated by employer action
which is based on unimpeachable legal doctrine or on bona fide
business considerations . Here the difficulty is not merely evidentiary; it is essentially a matter of establishing priorities between
competing groups, individuals, and social claims .
Cases involving the employer as a landowner illustrate this
point. One of our most ancient legal rules involves the right of a
landowner to determine who shall enter his land, and for what
purpose. Can a landowner who is also an employer enlist his wellestablished proprietary rights in the cause of his campaign against
his employees and their desire to unionize? For example, an employer may promulgate a rule forbidding any discussion of, or
solicitation for, the union in the plant. In this way, he may force
the union to resort to the laborious task of contacting each employee separately, at home, after work, instead of conveniently
while they are gathered together . The labour board has struck a
sensible balance in such cases. While an employer is entitled to
insist on efficiency and discipline in the plant, he must show that
the no-solicitation rule is actually designed for this purpose. If discussion of other topics is permitted, there is obviously no justification for interference with free employee discussion of unionism .'
In other words, bare-bones property rights are less important
than the rights of industrial citizenship.
A similar policy is clearly evolving in situations where employees' living and recreation quarters are employer-owned, such
as mining and logging camps, ships, and "company towns" . Here
there is an even greater need for restriction on the employer's
property rights because employee discussion, assembly and association must take place on the employer's premises, or not at all.
41 See, e.g ., Metropolitan Meat Packers Ltd., [1962] C.C .H. L.L .R.
P.16,230 (O .L .R.B.) ; for a contrary presumption see, Labour Code, R.S.Q .,
1964, c. 141, s. 16.
1 See e.g. Norish Ltd., [1965] June Mthly. Rep. 227 (O .L.R.B .) ; Delta
Steel, [1963] Oct. Mthly. Rep. 406 (O .L.R .B .) ; Canadian Controllers Ltd.,
[1966] May Mthly. Rep. 130 (O .L .R.B.) .
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Unless his property rights are relegated to second place, the
employer would enjoy complete freedom to obliterate industrial
liberties, to say nothing of ordinary civil rights unconnected with
industrial relations . This risk is accentuated if the employer can
exclude non-employees from the premises, so as to quarantine
employees against the dangerous virus of "foreign" ideas. Several
Canadian jurisdictions have taken the simple view that the law
of trespass governs the situation," and one has recently gone to
the other extreme of compelling the mine or woods operator to
admit a union organizer to the camp and to provide him with food
and lodging." The Ontario Labour Relations Act, however, requires the board to strike a delicate balance between employee
free speech and employer property rights, having regard to the
facts of the particular situation."
The problem of picketing dramatically juxtaposes property
interests and industrial "free speech" . Until the celebrated decision
in Williams v. Aristocratic Restaurants" in 1951, the most in
nocuous appeals to the public were stigmatized as interference
with the enjoyment of the picketed premises, a legal "nuisance" .
Today, the legality of picketing is largely measured in terms of
its legitimacy as a technique of industrial warfare : is it in support
of a lawful or unlawful strike?"' Is it violent or obstructive, so that
it falls below the standards set by the Criminal Code?" Even the
difficult question of picketing on shopping centre premises, which
violates the real property rights of both landlord and tenants, has
not been answered in terms which ignore labour relations realties ."
Running through all of these situations is a recurring, if seldom
articulated, theme. Industrial citizenship rights will be protected
and advanced at the expense of mere traditional property rights,
which are gratuitously exercised for no discernible business purpose . When, however, a genuine clash of policies occurs-as for
example between in-plant employee discussion and orderly production, or between picketing and the right of access to premises
°' Labour Relations Act, R.S .M ., 1954, c . 132, s . 5A ; R. v. Labelle
(1965), 48 D .L .R . (2d) 37 (Ont . C .A .) ; Anglo-Nfld. Development v. International Woodworkers (1958), 59 C .L .L .C . P .15,428 (Nfld .S .C .) .
"Labour Code, S .Q., 1964, c. 141, s . 8 .
"s Labour Relations Act,
R .S .O., 1960, c. 202, s. 53 . See Milrod Metal
Products Ltd. (1964), 64 C .L .L .C . P .16,007 (O .L.R .B .) .
46
Supra, footnote 25 .
"' Jacobsen Bros . v . Anderson (1962), 35 D .L .R. (2d) 746 (N .S .C.A .) ;
see contra, General Dry Batteries v. Brigenshaw, (1951] O.R . 522 .
"a Williams v. Aristocratic Restaurants, supra, footnote 25 .
"s See Arthurs, Comment, Picketing
on Shopping Centres (1965), 43
Can . Bar Rev . 357 .
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-priority is seldom given to libertarian values . It is unlikely that
the balance will shift in favour of employees, in order, to permit
them to pursue their economic interests at the cost of business
enterprise or public order. As will be seen, the expansion of
economic rights under legislative aegis has to some extent superseded total reliance on collective bargaining and other employee
self-help activities .
3 . Protection Against Union Action .
(a) The union as a political entity
aralleling the development of employee status, 'and the effective protection of rights attached to that status, was the development of the union as the institutional vehicle for the advancement
of employee interests." At first, the courts viewed unions as combinations in restraint of trade. Obviously the law would not - intervene in the affairs of these illegal organizations." Gradually, they
gained the shadowy existence of clubs or voluntary associations,
but legal regulation was still tentative. It was based on the theory
that members of the union, by subscribing to its constitution,
entered into a contract with each other. If the Supreme Court's
1957 decision in Orchard v. Tunney" was the fullest flowering of
this approach, it was soon to wither. By 1960, Therien v. Teamsters" had identified the union as a legal entity, responsible as
such for its wrongs to third persons, and capable of suing to protect its institutional interests
In terms of the protection of membership rights, the change
from contractual to institutional existence was critical . Obviously,
under the contract theory even union rules which were unfair were
to be enforced because they were the product of consensus, unless
they could be struck down on rather dubious grounds of "public
" See generally Palmer, Union Security and the Individual Worker
(1963-4), 15 U.T.L.J . 336 ; The Impact of Union Security in Canada
(1964), 13 Buff. L. Rev. 515.
"See e .g. Beaulieu v . Cochrane (1898), 29 O.R. 151 ; Parker v . Toronto
Musical Protective Association (1900), 32 O .R . 305; Chase v. Starr, supra,
footnote 16 .
"[19571 S .C .R . 436 ; see Comment, (1958), 36 Can . Bar Rev. 83 .
"Supra, footnote 19 . See generally Sherbaniuk, Actions By or Against
Trade Unions in Contract or in Tort (1958), 12 U.T.L.J. 151 for the development of the civil status of unions prior to Therien . The Therien case
does not apply in Ontario, see Nipissing Hotel v . Hotel Employees Union
(1963), 36 .R
.L (2d) 81 (Ont . H .C.) .
D
.
54 In Senkiw v. Utility Glove . (1967), 62 D .L .R. (2d) 48 (Man . C.A.),
it was held that this new ability of a union to sue as a legal entity in its
own name precludes suit by its officers acting in a representative capacity,
which was the former practice .
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policy"," or interpreted out of existence by a hostile court." Moreover, the procedural rules of the constitution, as well as its substantive provisions, bound members. They were therefore obliged
to exhaust internal remedies before turning to the courts for
assistance," a requirement that seriously impaired the effectiveness
of such assistance . Finally, employees who were not union members were denied even the questionable protection of the union's
constitution ; they were strangers to the "contract" .
By contrast, acceptance of the union's institutional character
opened the door to the development of significant and appropriate
techniques of protection . Recently, legislation has begun to ensure
a minimum standard of union democracy. For example, unions
are no longer entirely free to replace duly elected local officials
with trustees appointed by a parent body ;" copies of constitutions,
financial statements and collective agreements are now made available to members, so that leaders may be held accountable through
internal political pressures;" offensive discriminatory provisions
in union constitutions are outlawed ." Obviously legislation is
imminent for Canadian unions-as exists for corporations" and
for American unions"-regulating the honesty of union financial
affairs, and ensuring the right of members to participate fully in
the union's government .
At the procedural level, three distinct developments are apparent . First, the court themselves have begun to relax the requirement that internal remedies be exhausted." Second, adminis"See e.g . S.I .U . v. Stern, [19611 S.C .R . 682; Burwash v. Ironworkers
(1964), 65 C.L.L.C. P.14.045 (B .C .S.C .) ; Kennedy v. Gillis (1961), 30
D.L .R . (2d) 82 (Ont. H.C.) .
as Bimson v. Johnston (1958), 12 D.L .R . (2d) 379 (Ont. C.A.) ; Carlin
v. Galbraith (1959), 20 D.L .R. (2d) 679 (N .B .C.A.) .
"Kuszych v. White, [1951] 3 D.L .R . 641 (P.C .) ; Jurak v. Cunningham
(1959), 21 D.L.R. (2d) 58 (B .C.S .C.) ; Anderson v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers (1967), 67 C.L .L .C . P.14,015 (Man. Q.B .) ; but see Hornak v.
Patterson (1966), 58 D.L .R. (2d) 175 B.C .C.A.) .
ss See, e.g., Labour Relations Act, R.S .O ., 1960, c. 202, s. 60 .
ss See Labour Relations Act, R.S .B .C ., 1960, c. 205, s. 66A; Alberta
Labour Act, R.S.A., 1955, c. 1967, s. 107a ; Labour Relations Act, R.S.O .,
1960, c. 202, ss . 61-3 ; Industrial Relations Act, S.P .E.I ., 1962, c. 18, s. 47 ;
Trade Union Act, S.Nfld., 1960, c. 59, ss. 8-10.
" See e.g., Labour Relations Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c. 202, s. 10 ; Ontario
Code of Human Rights, S.O ., 1961-62, c. 93, s. 4; Employment Discrimination Act, R.S .Q, 1964, c. 142, s. 3; Fair Employment Practices Act, R.S.M .,
1954, c. 81, s. 4(3) ; Canada Fair Employment Practices Act, S.C ., 1952-3,
c. 19, s. 4(3) (4) .
ez See e .g., Corporations Act, R.S .O ., 1960, c. 71 ; Companies Act,
R.S .C .,
1952, c. 53 ; Securities Act, R.S .O., 1960, c. 363 .
"Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act
(1959), 73 Stat . 519 ; 29 U.S .C. ss . 401-531.
"Hornak v. Patterson, supra, footnote 57 .
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trative remedies exist, at least in seminal form, which afford the
employee speedy, cheap and sophisticated relief against certain
kinds of union impropriety." Third, and most dramatic, unioncreated tribunals, such as the UAW Public Review Board," represent a more promising forum for genuine employee protection
than administrative tribunals or the regular courts .
(b) The union as a bargaining agency

While internal union political processes are important, the
more critical developments involve the union's role as the exclusive bargaining agent of all employees in an enterprise . A car
dinal principle of collective bargaining legislation is that when a
majority of a group of employees, who constitute an appropriate
bargaining unit, select a union as bargaining agent, it represents
all employees in the unit . Union members will continue to relate
to the union on the basis of loyalty and emotional commitment,
but their economic gains do not come to them in their capacity as
union members. Rather all employees, regardless of union affiliation, are entitled to receive the fruits of collective bargaining simply
because they are employees. It is therefore important to perceive
the union's relationship with employees as quite distinct from the
union's relationship with its members, although the two groups
will always overlap and may sometimes be identical .
Since by force of law the union represents all employees irf
the bargaining unit, whether union members or not, it has been
repeatedly argued that the union is under a duty to treat all fairly
and without hostile discrimination . At least in obiter dicta, both
boards" and courts" have now recognized this duty, although
remedies have seldom been made available to employees harmed
by its breach . By the same token, since the union is obliged to
represent all employees, the argument has been made that all
should be made to bear a share of the costs of creating and administering the contractual regime. The famous Rand formula"
"Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. Ltd. (1965), 66 C.L .L .C. P.16,071
(O .L .R.B.) ; Plumbers Local 67, [1966] Oct. Mthly. Rep. 513 (O .L .R.B.) .
6' Note, Public Review Boards : A Check on Union Disciplinary Power
(1958), 11 Stan . L . Rev . 497 ; Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor
Unions : Some Reflections (1959), 58 Mich . L. Rev . 55 ; Stieber, Oberer,
& Harrington, Democracy and Public Review (1960) .
"E .g. Wallace Barnes Co. Ltd ., [1961] C .C.H. L .L .R. P.16,198 (O.L.R.B.) .
"O .C .A .W . Local 16-601 v. Imperial Oil, supra, footnote 32, at p . 593,
per Martland J .
ss U.A .W. & Ford Motor
Co. (1946), 46 Lab . Gaz. 123 ; see also Dudra,
Union Security in Canada (1961), 12 Lab . L .J . 585 .
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requires that non-unionists, as a condition of employment, pay a
service fee to the union equal to the dues paid by members. In
effect, a tax is levied on all employees to defray the costs of
governing the employment relationship . While obviously fair, even
this formula leaves unresolved problems . First, as a matter of
conscientious or religious conviction, some individuals may decline to make any contribution to the union. An eminently fair
Saskatchewan statute" enables such individuals to seek exclusion
from the bargaining unit, and removes any financial incentive to
false claims of conscientious objection by providing for a charitable contribution in lieu of union dues or service fee . Second, not
all union funds are expended in contract negotiation or administration . Some are spent in the promotion of the union's institutional
interests in organizing workers in other firms, or in political or
legislative activities . Of course, these activities may enhance the
unon's power, stabilize the labour market, or culminate in a protective statute. Nonetheless, non-unionists may be forced to support activities from which they derive no immediate benefit, and
to which they may be expressly opposed. In British Columbia,
this problem has been partly solved by the rather drastic expedient
of forbidding the expenditure of any union funds on political activity ." A more sophisticated solution which has been suggested,"
is to "tax" the non-unionists at a reduced rate, discounting that
proportion of the dues dollar devoted to non-collective bargaining
activities of the union. Finally, the Rand formula does not affect
situations in which the union is, in reality, a monopolist selling
labour through its hiring hall . The formula is designed to protect
workers who are already employed, or who may from time to time
be hired. However, when union membership is a prerequisite to
employment, the right to refrain from membership becomes the
certainty of abstaining from work . Here the solution lies in removing exclusive union control over the hiring hall . A viable
scheme might well involve a joint labour-management-government
employment agency, serving all who seek work, but giving preference to union members when workers are sought by an employer
who has agreed to a union security provision."
"Trade Union Act, R.S.S ., 1965, c. 287, s. 5(l) as amended by S.S.,
1966, c. 83, s. 3.
°° Labour Relations Act, R.S.B .C ., 1960, c. 205, as amended by S.B .C.,
1961, c. 31 .
'1 Dudra, The Swiss System of Union Security (1959), 10 Lab. L.7 . 165.
'z Cf. Report of Industrial Inquiry Commission on
the Disruption of
Shipping (Norris Report) (1963), p. 307.
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The basic issue of the right to abstain from unionism altogether
has been resolved on a pragmatic, rather than a principled, basis.
In theory, freedom from association is as much a libertarian ob
jective as freedom of association . However, the greatest support
for "right-to-work" laws comes from employers who see the nonunion employee as a divisive and debilitating factor in the united
ranks of labour. To the extent that a union's monopoly of the
labour supply is imperfect its bargaining strength is inhibited.
Thus, the right of the individual to abstain from union membership has been largely sacrificed in, order to maintain a power
balance between union and management. Few restrictions have
been placed on the union's right to force workers into membership through the compulsion of union security provisions in collective agreements, although cruder forms of coercion are naturally
forbidden. A major effort, however, is made to -ensure that the
union does in fact enjoy majority support amongst employees
before it is entitled to demand that membership be made a condition of employment . Certification following a secret ballot, or
representation over a substantial period of time, is viewed as
prima facie evidence that the majority of workers freely favour
the union; once this fact is established, the majority are in effect
entitled . to conscript the minority into membership ."'
While majority rule and the union's exclusive right of representation are each entirely justifiable on pragmatic grounds, in
combination they may produce undesirable and unnecessary hard
ship . Perhaps the clearest example of this is the plight of the nonunion employee who seeks an impartial interpretation of the union
security clause, upon which his continued employment may depend. Present legislation contemplates, and agreements inevitably
provide, that only the union may pursue pre-arbitration procedures,
and establish the board of arbitration . Thus, if a union seeks an
arbitration award to compel an employer to enforce a union
security clause against a non-union employee, there is no clear
statutory or contractual basis upon which he can claim the right
to participate in the hearing in order to 4rgue for a contrary interpretation of the clause . True, the employer, may wish to dispute
the union's interpretation, and thereby indirectly shield the nonunion employee, but this still leaves him to the charity of an
uncommonly high-minded employer . More often, the employer
will simply' concede the point to the union, and the employee will
be left without protection . Essentially similar is the plight of the
"Labour Relations Act, R.S.O ., 1960,'c. 202, s. 35 .
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employee who is in disfavour with the union, although a member
of it . If he is expelled or suspended from the union, he may be
discharged under the union security clause ." Even without recourse
to that clause, he may be discharged for some spurious reason as
the result of connivance between the union and a co-operative
employer.' In all of these cases, arbitration is foreclosed because
the union will obviously not carry forward the case of an individual
seeking relief against the union itself .
Predictably, labour boards and courts have begun to grope towards a solution by giving the employee a remedy against the
union based upon the breach of a fiduciary duty" violation of the
union's constitution," or perhaps illegality under the labour relations legislation .'' Save in the last category of cases, which is confined to union dealings with the employer, there appears to be no
way of securing reinstatement in employment for the discharged
employee, because no determination is made of the employee's
rights vis-à-vis the employer . A common law action for wrongful
dismissal against the employer would, of course, supply this missing element, but is open to the criticism that arbitral administration
of the collective agreement is confused by the occasional and unfamiliar intervention of a court." Another possibility, adumbrated
by a recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal," and apparently adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada," is to permit
the employee to intervene in arbitration proceedings in which the
union is seeking a result which specifically, directly and adversely
affects his interests. This ingenious extrapolation of the "right to
be heard" principle, however, is open to many practical objections .
First, the union may simply win its point in discussions with the
employer, without even constituting a board of arbitration ; no question of a hearing need ever arise . Second, if a hearing did occur,
the number of interveners is potentially large, and their presence
"See e.g . Jurak v. Cunningham, supra, footnote 57 ; Brady v. Heinekey (1960), 24 D .L .R . (2d) 737 (B .C .C .A .) ; McAnally Freightways Ltd.,
[1964] . C .C .H . L .L.R . P .16,011 (O.L.R .B .) .
°s See dictum in Pitt St . Hotel (1963), 63 C.L.L.C. P .16,275 (O .L .R.B .) .
's See e.g. Hornak v. Patterson, supra, footnote 57 ; cf . Murphy v.
Robertson, (1941] 3 D .L.R. 30 (Man. C .A.) .
"See e.g . S.I.U. v. Stern, supra, footnote 55 ; Orchard v, Tunney, supra,
footnote 52 .

°a Canadian Dredge & Dock
Co . Ltd, supra, footnote 64 ; Plumbers
Union, Local 67, supra, footnote 64 .
"See e.g . Miratnichi Hospital v. Woods (1967), 59 D .L.R . (2d) 290

(N.B .C .A.) .
'OR. v. Ottawa, ex parte Bradley, [19671 2 O .R . 311 (C .A.) .
"Re Hoogendoorn & Greening Metal Products, [1967] 1 O .R . 712
(C .A.), rev'd by S .C .C. Nov ., 1967, unreported .
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at the hearing would be disruptive . Third, the union's ability to
function as a broker between divergent employee interests, and its
authority to speak on behalf of the group, are both undermined.
More promising would be a legislative requirement that an
individual employee, dismissed in circumstances where he is in
conflict with the union, be given the opportunity to constitute a
board of arbitration at his own expense." The board would hear
representations from the employee, the employer and the union,
and would be entitled to give relief against the latter in appropriate
cases ; in addition, the board would be able to order reinstatement
of the employee because the employer would be a party to the
proceedings .
This proposal is but a single instance of the evident need to
treat the union and the employees as distinct, if not opposed, in
interest ." While this view may stem from an accurate judgment
that the union is not totally responsive to - employee desires, its
full legislative implications are by no means obvious.
ne approach to protection against union oppression of employees involves disestablishment of the union as a dominant force
on the labour market . By guaranteeing individual employees the
right to remain aloof from the union in setting the terms of employment, or in administering the collective agreement made by
the union, the freedom of individual employees would in theory
be enhanced . However, experience demonstrates that the undermining of the system of collective bargaining would in fact reduce
employee liberty by substituting less benevolent employer power
for union power. Quite opposite in conception, but equally questionable, is the attempt to totally democratize the union, to make
it completely responsive to the workers it represents. For three
reasons, . however, the costs of such an approach fall ultimately
on the public and on management, rather than on the employees.
First, political pressures from below may cause insecure union
officers to adopt bargaining positions which are unrealistic, or to
champion grievances which are without merit, thus exacerbating
union-management relations. Second, the technical knowledge and
efficiency of professional union officers may produce policies
which in the long run benefit workers more than the unsophisti"See Laskin, Collective Bargaining and Individual Rights (1963), 6
Can. Bar Jo . 278.
"Ibid . : "It is possible in today's climate of opinion to be a proponent
of individual employee rights without being hostile to collective bargaining."
Cf . Wilson J. in Contractors Equipment & Supply v . Building Material
Drivers (1965), 65 C.L.L,C . I'.14,090, at p. 275 : ". . . the `Union' . . . is
nothing more than the aggregation of the employees . . . .
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called majority decisions which are likely to result from participatory democracy. Third, as a practical matter, if union officers
were obliged to seek a new mandate for each new situation, they
could not cope with the fast moving events of the bargaining relationship. In effect, the union would become an economic dinosaur
whose intelligence and nervous system would be inadequate to the
demands of a large and uncoordinated body attempting to survive
in a hostile environment.
Between these polar positions of total disestablishment and
total democracy lies a third approach, the public utility analogy."
A public utility enjoys, by statute, a monopoly in the supply of a
particular service. In exchange for, and because of, its monopoly
position, it becomes a fiduciary which owes to its customers efficient and non-discriminatory service, at reasonable cost . The customers enforce these obligations not through direct political or
economic action, by voting on proposed rate changes or by seeking
an alternative supplier of the service, but rather through the supervisory power of a public regulatory agency . In somewhat the same
way, the union has an exclusive, state-sanctioned, monopoly within the bargaining unit: it alone can negotiate regarding the terms
of employment of its "customers", the employees. It can be persuasively argued that the union should be made to use its monopoly
position on their behalf in a non-discriminatory fashion, and be
held accountable through the enforcement of statutory standards
of fair representation by the labour relations board. However, it
should not be thought that union decision-making would thereby
be confined except within the broadest limits . For example, a
union decision to allow management unrestricted freedom to innovate may cost workers with low skills and low seniority their
jobs, although the ultimate result of the decision is to ensure
better wages for the remaining employees in a more profitable
enterprise. To impugn such a decision, the displaced workers
would have to show not merely that they were harmed by the
union's concession, but that the union made no serious attempt to
protect them by negotiating for alternate employment or severance
pay. Similarly, a union which provided employees with substandard service in the prosecution of grievances would only be
called to account if it could be shown that its failure was due to
neglect or discrimination, rather than lack of financial resources
to employ staff or to pay arbitration costs. The doctrine of "fair
84
See Ross, Labor Organizations and the Labor Movement in Advanced
Industrial Society (1964), 50 Va . L. Rev. 1359, at p. 1366 et seq.
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return on investment" which is used to gauge public utility rates
could be translated in the labour context as "reasonable service"
in relation to the economic and human resources available to the
union. ®f course, union officers would continue to be held accountable to the membership, as they presently are, through
periodic elections, referenda, and convention votes. The "public
utility" analogy is intended to measure the union's legal responsibility, rather than limit its institutional vitality.
This bifurcated approach to the union-as a political institution and as a bargaining agent-will no doubt characterize legal
developments over the coming years. The most promising from a
libertarian viewpoint is probably the latter. By focussing on the
union's discharge of its obligations to all employees, a coherent
and complete code of conduct will gradually be developed which
makes their position as industrial citizens economically more
secure . But the law inevitably will become involved in union
political processes as well. As union organization spreads, the
group of non-union workers will diminish in importance. As is
already the case in some highly organized industries, the union's
two roles will become indistinguishable, so that political processes
will determine bargaining decisions and the "public utility" approach to barganing will affect internal political decisions .
Apart from this congruency of members and employees, internal political processes will increasingly demand legal regulation and
protection because of the changing focus of union activity. Instead
of being total preoccupied with collective bargaining, unions are
becoming important social institutions . Already they endorse
candidates for public office, participate in a labour-affiliated party,
and make representations to governments on a broad spectrum of
subjects ranging from foreign policy to fiscal policy, from accident
prevention to consumer protection . In recent years, unions have
established housing cooperatives, medical clinics, recreation centres and educational institutions . As these activities become increasingly important features of union membership, the union will
have to develop governmental structures to administer them. It
can be predicted, then, that there will be a shift in emphasis in
union "public law", similar to that which has occurred with the
emergence of the welfare state . Instead of an obsessive concern
with protection of the individual against official action, greater
attention will be given to his right to participate in the positive
benefits of programmes designed to ensure his economic wellbeing
in a complex industrial society. An obvious prerequisite of this
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participation must be the right to be admitted to union membership, especially where membership is the key to employment
and its benefits ."
Against Economic Insecurity .
Social security legislation which protects everyone against the
economic burdens of illness and old age, has a special significance
for employees. As members of a large lower-income group, they
obviously stand to benefit from health insurance and pension plans
-less than those who are unemployed or on fixed incomes, but
more than self-employed, professional and business groups . However, employees benefit from such universal plans as members
of the general community, rather than as industrial citizens. By
contrast, such schemes as workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance are designed to relieve against special risks incurred by workers, and not by other groups . Consequently, entitlement to benefits under these schemes turns on a past or present
job nexus."
Historically, however, neither universal nor employment-related
legislation developed early in North America to satisfy the needs
and expectations of employees. In default of public action, labour
and management with considerable ingenuity, constructed a private
regime of social security within industry .
In the early years, pension plans, sickness and welfare benefits,
and burial expenses were provided by paternalistic employers or
union-sponsored self-help organizations . These schemes often in
volved innuendoes of charity, were almost always restricted to
small groups identified with a particular employer or union, and
were, of course, liable to be modified or terminated by the unilateral act of their initiator. The effort to provide economic
"rights" for employees, as opposed to mere charity, therefore led
unions to press for the inclusion of provisions in collective agreements which established these welfare plans on a bilateral basis.
Union-management agreements to provide "fringe benefits"
created for the employee at least an aura of entitlement. As will be
seen, the ability of an employee to enforce the provisions of a
collective agreement is a matter of considerable controversy.
Shortly put, the employee is not a party to the collective agree4. Protection

" See generally Rideout, The Right to Membership of a Trade Union
(1962) ; Hickling, The Right to Membership of a Trade Union, [19671
U.B.C .L . Rev. 243.
"See e.g. Unemployment Insurance Act, S.C ., 1955, c. 50 (as amended),
s. 25 ; Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S .O., 1960, c. 437, s. 3.
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ment, and may not be able to enforce it except by means of legal
proceedings initiated by the uni6n. Strictly speaking, then, his
legal rights under a bilateral social security regime are no greater
than under a unilateral regime . However, as a practical matter
the employee's position was much enhanced by this development.
When a union and an employer negotiate a collective agreement,
concessions won by the union in the area of welfare are traded
off against union concessions to management which are of monetary value, including wages. The employee feels, quite accurately,
that he has sacrificed -present income for future protection. Welfare benefits, thus viewed as deferred payment for past services,
are at least arguably "vested" once the service has been performed ."
Perhaps most important, as a practical matter, is the likelihood
that the union's legal and economic power will be used to secure
and protect welfare benefits for employees. No longer is the em
ployee dependent upon his employer's largesse ; it is unlikely that
he will for long continue to depend upon the willingness of the
union to advance his interests. As part of the general movement
towards enforcement of the union's fiduciary obligations to those
it represents, the law will surely first insist upon protection .by
the union of these "vested" rights .
Finally, the very arrangments by which welfare plans are administered generate internal safeguards for employee rights . Where
administration is entrusted to a nonpartisan professional administra
tor, such as an insurance company, its institutional integrity is
likely to produce fair disposition of deserving claims . Where administration is placed in the hands of a joint committee, the confrontation of labour and management members is likely to reduce
the incidence of capricious and discriminatory treatment.
Within this framework of private, consensual, labour-management "legislation" have emerged a wide variety of important
"rights" : pensions; sickness, accident, medical, hospital and life
insurance; seniority and "just cause for discharge" provisions
which are of special importance to older workers facing layoff or
compelled retirement ; work rules and "featherbedding" provisions
which cushion the impact of technological change ; vacations; overtime, shift and holiday premium pay which helps to "civilize" and
s' See e .g. Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. (1955), 6 L.A.C . 56 (Prof.
Laskin) ; Caland Ore Co. Ltd. (1963, unreported award, Reville C .C.J.) ;
Filkington Bros. (Canada) Ltd. (1966), 17 L .A .C. 146 (Prof. Arthurs) ; but
see contra, R . v. Fuller, ex parte &orles, supra, footnote 40 ; Close v . Globe
& Mail, [19671 1 O.R . 235 (C.A.) .
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regularize work routines . In many cases-pensions and vacations
are a striking example-private legislation has provided a model
for public lawmaking.
However, there are limits to the security system which can be
created by private union-management arrangements . First, the very
fact that such schemes are consensual and private is an inherent
weakness . If the welfare benefits are rooted in the provisions of a
collective agreement, termination of the agreement topples the
entire structure . To be sure, if a new agreement is signed which
revives and renews the scheme, no harm is done. If, however, a
long unresolved strike occurs, or if either the union or the company ceases to exist, the contractual regime may be permanently
shattered ." Moreover, the "reserved rights" school of arbitral
jurisprudence may permit the employer to circumvent or subvert
the whole scheme. For example, in the celebrated case of Canadian Car Foundry v. Dinham," an employer was permitted unilaterally to establish a pension plan, and to fix an age for compulsory retirement, despite a contractual promise that employees
would be discharged only for cause. Because the agreement made
no explicit mention of their pensions or retirement, the employer
was permitted to terminate the service of the older workers,
although their seniority and ability ought to have guaranteed continued employment for them. Finally, as indicated, the employee
may not himself be able to enforce rights under the collective
agreement and is thus to some extent a pawn in the power relationship between union and employer .
Second, it must be remembered that a union is responsive to
internal political pressures . Given the willingness of an employer
to make a total wage settlement of a fixed amount, one of the
functions of a union is to ensure that this amount is distributed
within the industrial community in a way which is acceptable, if
not "just" . For example, a decision may have to be taken as to
whether all employees should receive the same hourly increase,
or whether skilled employees should be rewarded by a proportionately larger increase. Similarly, a choice may have to be made
between improvements in the present hourly pay of workers, or
creation of a system of social welfare . While wages are received
by all workers, "fringe benefits" may only help a relatively small
group of older workers, or those who are victims of illness -'or
$$ R . v . Fuller, ex parte Earles, ibid.; U.M .W. v. McKinnon, [19581
S.C .R. 202 .
" [19601 S .C.R . 3 ; see also Re Sandtivich Windsor and Amherstburg
Railway (1961), 26 D .L .R. (2d) 704 (Ont. C .A .) .
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dislocation, circumstances which are conjectural or in the distant
future . "More now" or "more latér" is a difficult political decision .
A preponderance of younger workers may influence the union to
choose the former, and thus inhibit the growth of adequate pension
or insurance schemes .
Third, the dimensions of the social problem may be broader
than those of the bargaining relationship . For example, technological change may make a group of unskilled workers redundant.
However, if large numbers are displaced and if no alternative
jobs can be found within the enterprise, what then? One solution
would simply be to turn these employees loose into the labour
market, where unemployment insurance will help to tide them
over until they find new work . This solution is being viewed with
increasing disfavour on both policy and pragmatic grounds. As to
the former, most modern governments appear anxious to avoid
the loss of purchasing power and of self-esteem which are the
twin penalties of unemployment. As to the latter, efficient utilization of human resources dictates that unemployment should be
minimized, as does the unproductive outlay of unemployment
benefits . Thus, two important approaches are developing, a shortrun policy of avoiding unemployment, and a long-run policy of
labour market management .
A number of devices have been employed to protect the jobs
of those threatened with layoff or discharge. Make-work rules
have been written into collective agreements ; severance pay or re
dundancy pay has been advocated to compel the employer to "buy
out" job rights ; employers have been required to consult or bargain with unions over changes, or the effects of changes, in production techniques, where job security is imperilled ." These techniques, largely contract-based, are all designed to protect workers,
but have the unfortunate effect of inhibiting technological change
by enhancing its cost to the innovating employer. More promising
are devices which enhance worker mobility, either making equivalent alternative employment available or upgrading the workers'
skills . Sometimes this can be done by the private action of a single
firm and unibn. For example, intrafirm transfers and retraining
have been attempted, and made more palatable by relocation al"See Cowan, Proposed Measures to Facilitate Manpower Adjustment
to Technological and Other Change : Twelve Selected Case Studies (1967,
Economic Council of Canada) ; Keys & Wright, Manpower Planning- in
Industry: A Case Study (1966, Economic Council of Canada, Staff Study
No. 18) .
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lowances and other financial inducements ." Sometimes government collaboration or initiative is required . For example, industries may be given incentives to move to labour surplus areas,
and unemployed low-skilled workers may be sent for training to
special schools and given living allowances while learning a new
trade.` Of course, general governmental measures designed to
stimulate the economy, and sound basic educational policies, in the
long run are the most important techniques available for avoidance
of worker dislocation .
This web of private and public measures, while loojely woven,
is gradually capturing an elusive notion: the right to economic
security. Technology, sociology and probably psychiatry will de
termine the nieans by which this right will be vindicated . Whether
we can produce more while working less, whether increased leisure
time is to be channelled into education or recreation or into secondary employment, whether work is a psychological necessity, are all
questions beyond the scope of this article . But it does seem likely
that citizens of the industrial community will gradually come to
enjoy protection against the erratic action of a particular employer or the economy as a whole, in much the same way as
citizens of the general community gradually came to enjoy protection against arbitrary governmental action ."
Yet, with rights come responsibilities . In exchange for protection against the extreme fluctuations of an enterprise economy,
the worker is increasingly required to surrender his own freedom
to create crises for the community . As noted earlier, strikes which
disrupt essential services, such as transportation and communications, are viewed with increasing antipathy ." More significant,
in the long run, is the growing recognition that regulation of the
labour sector is an intrinsic part of the overall task of producing
91 See Cardin, A Study of Ways and Means of Improving the Contribution of Labour Relations in Canada to More Effective Manpower Adjustment to Change (1967, Economic Council of Canada) ; Economic Council
of Canada, Declaration on Manpower Adjustments to Technological and
Other Change (1967) .
" See e.g . Technical and Vocational
Training Assistance Act, S.C ., 196061, c. 6, as amended; Agricultural Rehlbilitation and Development Act,
S.C ., 1960-61, c. 30 ; Older Worker Employment and Training Incentive
Program Regulations, SOR/63-439 ; amended by SOR/64-104(1964) ; Manpower Mobility Regulations, SOR/67-163(1967),
'' C1. Trudeau, Economic Rights (1962), 8 McGill L.J . 121.
See Woods, Canadian Policy Experiments with Public-Interest Disputes
(1963), 14 Lab. L.J . 739, and see e.g. Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, S.O ., 1965, c. 48 ; Maintenance of Railway Operation Act, S.C .,
1966, c. 50 ; Essential Services Emergency Act, S.S ., 1966, c. 2; Right of
Education 8c Schooling Collective Agreement Plan Act, S.Q ., 1967, Bill 25 .
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a well-modulated economy . Labour costs do affect our domestic
growth rate and our international trading position, so that it seems
inevitable that governmental policies designed to secure important
national objectives will increasingly have to take priority over the
short-run objectives of individual workers and unions. No doubt
this will be accomplished largely by consultation and collaboration
between labour, management, and government; sometimes coercion
may be necessary . Paradoxically, then, the desire to protect the
industrial citizen against economic insecurity may diminish other
valued freedoms he now enjoys .
Larger questions of political philosophy and economic theory
remain to be answered before definitive value judgments can be
made about this trend. The thrust of these observations, however,
is merely to identify the cumulative effect of the enormous and
diffuse mass of legislative and contractual rules which have been
thrown up by the developing right to economic security.
III . The Development of an Industrial Jurisprudence.
Just as. a special set of rights and duties, indigenous to the industria.1 relations community has largely developed outside the general
law, so too has the enforcement of these rights and duties become
the primary concern of specialized tribunals rather than the regular
courts . Labour relations boards administer labour relations Acts,
while arbitration boards enforce the collective agreement, the private "legislation" created by the parties .
The shift from courts to boards has not been accomplished
without difficulty, nor is it by any means an established fact, even
after a quarter-century of modern labour legislation. Juridical tra
dition is strongly opposed to the notion that labour-management
relations exist in an industrial Alsatia, into which the royal writ
does not run. In earlier times, the Ding's courts waged a vigorous
contest to win jurisdiction from local and parochial bodies . In this
century, many judges have undertaken the task of protecting
citizens from the "new despotism" of administrative tribunals .
Yet the courts have proved to be°their own worst enemy in
the contest for exclusive or even primary jurisdiction in labour
matters . The Workmen's Compensation Act" was the direct pro
duct of the courts' refusal or inability to safeguard the physical
interests of employees ." The doctrinal vagueness, procedural awk's R.S.O., 1960, c. 437 .

"Report of Royal Commission on Laws Relating to the Liability of
Employers, Sir w. R. Meredith, Commissioner (1913, Ontario) .
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wardness, and alleged bias of the courts in regulating picketing led
to their virtual ouster from this activity in England in 1906,87 and in
the United States in 1932,88 and to violent demands for similar
action in Canada today." The early refusal of the courts to enforce collective agreements, coupled with the light-hearted judicial
observation that the remedy for breach is "not an action . . . but
the calling of a strike ",I°° consigned the protection of contractual
rights to arbitration . The experience of the Ontario Labour Court
in 1943-1944 in administering the first collective bargaining statute . . was apparently not satisfactory enough to warrant its resumption in the post-war era ."' The inappropriateness of criminal
sanctions in labour relations has led the parties to virtually ignore
the criminal courts as a forum for regulating wrongful conduct."'
The uninhibited judicial penchant for prerogative writ review of
the decisions of labour relations boards has spawned several generations of privative clauses, each more sophisticated than its predecessors, each equally ineffective against the onslaught of jurisdiction-jealous jurists ."' All of these seemingly diverse developments are bound together by a common theme : the courts often
seemed determined to handle labour litigation in a way which
might have been consistent with general jurisprudential concepts,
but which did not recognize the special needs and traditions of the
industrial community . As a result, the parties and the legislators
came to depend less and less on the courts as the protectors of
private rights or public policy .
Nor is the proliferation of boards solely a negative reaction to
the regular courts . It reflects, as well, a desire to bring to industrial
adjudication new procedures, evidentiary rules, and remedies . To

Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw . VII, c. 47.
08 Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932), 47 Stat . 70 .
"See e.g. Re Tilco Plastics v. Skurjat, A .G. Ont, v. Clark (1966), 57
D .L .R . (2d) 596 (Ont . H .C .), aff'd and leave to appeal to S .C.C . denied,
(1967), 61 D .L.R . (2d) 664 (Ont . C .A .) ; R. ex rel Nissho (Canada) v.
I.L .W.U. (1965), 66 C .L .L .C . P .14,113 (B .C .S .C.) ; R . V. Neale (1966),
67 C .L .L .C . P .14,016 (B .C .C.A .) .
'°° Young v. C.N.R., [1931] A.C . 83, at p . 89 .
"'Collective Bargaining Act, S .O ., 1943, c . 4 .
102
See Laskin, Labour Law : 1923-47 (1948) . 25 Can . Bar Rev . 286 ;
Finkelman, quoted in Bromke, The Labour Relations Board in Ontario
(1961), p . 24 .
"'See Bromke, ibid., pp. 60-61 .
"'See Laskin, Certiorari to Labour Boards : The Apparent Futility of
Privative Clauses (1952), 30 Can . Bar Rev . 986 ; Cutler, The Trade Union
Case Against Prerogative Writs (1957), 4 McGill L .J. 35 ; Strayer, The
Concept of Jurisdiction in Review of Labour Relations Board Decisions
(1963), 28 Sask . Bar Rev . 157 ; Weatherill, Labour Relations Boards and
the Courts, [1965] Nov . Mthly . Rep . 563 (O .L.R .B .) .
97
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some extent these aims have been accomplished. But the major
rationale of the boards is more basic yet : they are to decide cases
not on common law principles, but in accordance with industrial
jurisprudence-the statutes, customs and contracts which operate
exclusively in the world of labour relations."'
This uniqueness of both procedural and substantive rules in
turn complicates the relationship between courts and boards . When
board decisions are reviewed, they are frequently measured with
a common law yardstick rather than evaluated in their own context . Boards may therefore be tempted to become increasingly
court-like in order to avoid judicial censure."' When board decisions are quashed, the courts may interject unsuitable and incongruous doctrines into well-integrated administrative policies or
procedures . Thus the boards' ability to handle the problems assigned to them may be seriously impaired . Finally, when courts
encounter labour problems in the context of conventional litigation,
they tend to deal with them in a conventional way, rather than
remit them to specialized labour tribunals . Litigants are therefore
given a choice of forums and a choice of substantive rules, with
the result that inconsistent decisions may co-exist in related matters . This, again, dilutes the distinctiveness and effectiveness of
industrial adjudication .
Against this historical and practical background, several specific examples of the uniqueness of the forms, processes and doctrines of industrial decision-making deserve examination in detail .
1 . The Role of Industrial Tribunals.
(a) The decision-makers

oth judges and members of industrial tribunals should ideally
have certain qualities-intellectual honesty, patience, and wordly
wisdom. What distinguishes one group from the other is the
specialized talent which each brings to his role . The judge is above
all a skilled lawyer ; a lifetime lived in the law has inculcated in
him its premises, its analytical techniques, its principles . Presumably judges are selected from amongst those who are most knowledgeable about the law, precisely so they can bring this knowledge to bear in, the making of decisions . Industrial adjudicatorsarbitrators and board members-are selected, on the other hand,
... This is not to say that "industrial jurisprudence" is a fully-developed
system . See Carrothers, Labour Arbitration in Canada (1961), p. 18 : "A
new jurisprudence may be aborning ; but it is scarcely cracking its shell" .
. .. For an extensive discussion of this phenomenon, see Finkelman, The
Ontario Labour Relations Board and Natural Justice (1964) .
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because they have a particular knowledge of labour relations.
Whether this knowledge is the product of prior academic or practical training, or whether it is acquired on the job as they discharge
their limited and specialized functions, their salient characteristic
is that they understand and respond to the values of the industrial
community .
To underline the primacy of labour relations expertise over legal
skill, there is no requirement that members of industrial tribunals
even be lawyers ."' By tradition, of course, some tribunals (such as
labour relations boards) are often presided over by law-trained
chairmen. By default, lawyers and judges have gained a nearmonopoly in others (such as arbitration boards) ."' But the preeminence of lawyers cannot be taken as prinia facie evidence of
the relevance of legal skills. First, to some extent their presence
is to be explained by political pressures : some labour and management officials exhibit a real fear that new-fangled industrial relations concepts will govern their relationships, instead of the old
and familiar value judgments which are embodied in the common
law . Thus, they wish their disputes to be decided by those who
personify the older tradition rather than the newer one . Second,
to some extent court criticism of decisions which are labour relations-based rather than law-based, has led industrial decisionmakers who possess both types of skills to act like lawyers rather
than industrial relations experts ."' Third, in some critical areas,
such as job evaluation, even the most ardent advocates of lawbased adjudication acknowledge its inadequacies; here the best
and most popular arbitrators are engineers rather than lawyers .
Nonetheless, acknowledging the de facto control by lawyers and
law principles of much of the business of industrial tribunals, it
remains possible for non-lawyers to decide cases . That this possibility exists is strong evidence that their industrial expertise is
legitimate and relevant in the process of adjudication .
No more dramatic contrast exists between judges and their
counterparts in the world of industry than in the tripartite board .
See e.g . Labour Relations Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c. 202, s. 75 .
A survey covering the years 1960-61 showed that approximately
84% of all labour arbitrations in Ontario were heard by county and district
court judges, and other judicial personnel. Report of the Attorney General's
Committee on the Process of Arbitration in Ontario (E. H. Silk, Q.C .
chmn .) (1962) .
109 gut
cf . Carrothers, op. cit., footnote 105, p. 13 : "Whatever theories
an arbitrator may harbour as to the nature and purpose of his office, a common denominator of his function must be the test, `Is it faithful to basic
legal principles?' Anything short of that mark is wasted effort ."
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The judge, of course, must be impartial; any extracurial connection with the parties or the controversy disqualifies him. By definition, the opposite is true of members of a tripartite board. Apart
from the chairman, the members of the board of labour arbitration, for example, are nominated precisely because they are known
to be sympathetic (if not totally loyal) to the position of their
nominator. While some courts have attempted to force the members of tripartite tribunals to be impartial,"' and others have
tolerated their notorious partisanship,"' the parties continue to
expect, and to receive, the almost automatic support of their respective nominees in the deliberations and decisions of arbitration boards . Why, then appoint partisans if their response is so
predictable? Why not leave the impartial chairman free to reach
by himself the decision which, in a tripartite board, carries the day
by a majority vote? The answer must lie in the expectation of
the parties that the nominee will influence the decision of the
chairman. Since he is often law-trained while the nominees are
not, it is reasonable to assume that their function is to bring industrial norms to his attention, and thus to produce a result which
is meaningful in context, whether or not it is right in law. Even
where both chairman and nominees are lawyers, it is most unlikely
that the latter are nominated to the board in the hope of enhancing the legal quality of its decision. Rather, their role is to
deflect a law-based decision if it is inimical to the interest of their
nominator, and to fight vigorously for such a decision if it is favourable . This is hardly an attractivé picture of the tripartite board,
but it is an accurate one: the parties do not expect or want industrial adjudicators to act like judges .
Finally, the typical board of labour arbitration is created ad
hoc, to hear and dispose of a single controversy. Since security of
tenure is viewed as the bedrock of judicial independence, there is
good reason to believe that the parties do not wish to insulate the
arbitrator from certain pressures which are thought to distort truly
impartial adjudication . More precisely, .the parties want the arbitrator to be aware that he draws his mandate from them, and that
he should be responsive to their interests . Since he must hold an
even hand as between labour and management, it seems likely
that they wish to emphasize his fidelity to their private system of
law rather than to the general legal system . If he displeases either
"° See Arthurs, The Three Faces of Justice-Bias in the Tripartite Tribunal (1963), 28 Sask. Bar Rev. 147 and cases cited therein.
"' Re Gainers Ltd. (1964), 47 W.W.R . 544 (Alta. S.C .) ; C.A .L.P .A . v.
C.P.A . (1966), 57 D.L.R . (2d) 417 (B .C.C .A .) .
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party, by producing a decision which does violence to industrial
norms (as they are perceived by that party), he will not be invited to arbitrate again. By contrast, a government is unable to
remove a judge from office simply because he has "violated"
general legal norms in reaching a particular decision .
In summary, then, adjudication of industrial disputes is often
assigned to persons whose relevant expertise is their knowledge
of labour relations rather than law, and whose decisions are forced
by institutional pressures into an industrial mould rather than a
legal one.
(b) The process of decision-snaking
As might be expected, the techniques by which industrial tribunals make decisions are not identical to those employed by the
courts . In a broad sense, of course, arbitrators and labour boards
are engaged primarily in adjudication, and the adversary process
characterizes most of their hearings . However, there are distinctive
features of industrial adjudication .
The fact-finding process, for example, is much more flexible.
Conventional evidentiary rules are inapplicable,"' s o that hearsay
is admissible, if seldom compelling . More importantly, industrial
tribunals are free to exercise initiative in seeking out facts through
inspection by tribunal members or their subordinates.. . and through
conferences with the parties"' or with other persons having relevant views.... "Official notice" of facts notorious to those engaged
in labour relations is frequently relied upon to lay the foundation
for, or to evaluate, facts adduced by the parties."' Within the confines of the rules of natural justice, a broad mandate has been given
labour boards to develop appropriate fact-finding mechanisms .' .'
"'See e .g. Labour Relations Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c. 202, ss . 34(7)(c),
77(2)(c) ; R.S.B .C ., 1960, c. 205, s. 62(7), but see Langley Fruit Workers
v. U.P .H.W . (1967), 61 D.L .R. (2d) 31 (P .E .I .S .C .)
..a See e.g . Labour Relations Act, R.S .O ., 1960, c. 202, ss . 34(7) (d) (e),
75(2)(e)(g) ; Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, R.S .C .,
1952, c. 152.
`"4 See e .g. Procedure of Examiner's Inquiry into Duties and Responsibilities, O.L.R.B . Practice Note #4. (Dec. 10th, 1962, as amended July
28th, 1965, Sept . 26th, 1966) (Examiner appointed by Labour Relations
Board to investigate eligibility of employees for inclusion in bargaining
unit meets with parties informally) .
"' See e .g . Fraser-Brace Engineering, [1964] Mar. Mthly. Rep. 660
(O .L.R .B .) ; W. F . Flynn, [1964] June Mthly Rep. 112 (O .L .R.B .) (Board
holds hearing of all interested persons-including non-litigants-to determine suitability of proposed geographic bargaining unit) .
"I See Finkelman, op . cit., footnote 106, p. 40, et seq .
.. .See e .g. Payfair Stores v. L.R .B . (1965), 51 W.W .R . 472 (Man .
Q.B .) .
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Law-finding equally offers arbitrators and labour boards considerable scope for creativity . The absence of any appellate arbitral
tribunal precludes the application of a rule of stare decisis. Thus,
conflicting decisions, advanced by different arbitrators, vie with
each other for acceptance in the "market place of ideas" . Consumer judgments there, expressed in terms of the arbitrator's
acceptability to labour and management, tend to mould decisions,
over a period of time, to the needs and expectations of the parties.
.Equally, the willingness of arbitrators to be persuaded by the
awards of their colleagues is some measure of the soundness of
those awards . Both of these influences, it should be noted, are indigenous to the world of industry rather than to the world of law.
The labour board, likewise unencumbered by any appellate structure, is free to experiment and to learn the lessons of experience .
This is not to say that the opportunities for creativity have always been seized boldly, or that consumer judgments have necessarily been open-minded. For example, few arbitrators have made
any imaginative response to the difficult problem of the employer's
right to "contract out" work ;... in time the possibility of dealing
with the problem through arbitration vanished."' Likewise, the labour board's evolving doctrines have sometimes seemed merely expedient to its critics,"' and even by its own admission board policy
has sometimes seemed ephemeral." .
To some extent the courts have reinforced the ability of tribunals to engage in free-form adjudication . For example, so long
as an arbitrator has dealt with the "very question" submitted to
him, his award is immune from review ."' This rule, to the extent
that it is honoured by the courts,"' leaves an arbitrator free to provide answers which are "wrong" in law, but "right" in industrial
relations terms. In a more affirmative way, the courts have repri113
See Young, The Contracting Out of Work-Canadian and U.S .A .
Industrial Relations Experience (1964) .
"'See Russelsteel (1966), 17 L.A.C . 253 (Prof. Arthurs) .
120
See e .g . Associated Medical Services, (1961] C .C .H. L.L.R . P .16,218
(O .L.R .B .) per Young C .C . dissenting; quashed on cert ., sub . nom . A .M.S .
V. Ontario L .R.B ., [1962] O.R . 1093 (C .A .), aft'd [1964] S .C .R . 497 .
121 See
Finkelman, Office Bargaining Units in Ontario (speech to Labour
Relations Subsection, Ontario Section, Canadian Bar Association, 1964) reproduced in Arthurs (ed .), Labour Relations Law Casebook (1966), p .
6 .2 .2.
122
See e .g. Re Canadian Westinghouse & U .E .W . Local 504 (1961), 30
D.L.R . (2d) 676 (Ont . H .C .) ; R . V. Bigelow, ex parte Sefton (1965), 50
D .L .R . (2d) 38 (Ont . H .C .) ; R . v . Fuller, ex parte Earles, supra, footnote
40 .
123
See e.g . R . v . Bigelow, ex parte International Nickel Co. (1959), 19
D.L.R . (2d) 380 (Ont. C.A.) ("The board not only exceeded its powers
but it omitted to clearly determine the real issue before it .") ; Re Canadian
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manded administrative tribunals for over-rigid adherence to their
own doctrines and have urged them to decide each successive case
on its own merits .' 24
Caught between the temptations of freedom and its dilemmas,
industrial tribunals have yet accomplished some significant feats of
creativity by responding to labour policy rather than conventional
legal doctrine . For example, an arbitrator has ruled that an employee's seniority, though rooted in the collective agreement, survives its expiry .r25 The labour board has conditioned the granting of
bargaining rights upon the abandonment of a recognition strike,
thus reinforcing, without express statutory authority, its own peacekeeping powers ."' However, most creative decisions of industrial
tribunals are of a more modest sort, involving such techniques as
the implication of a condition of good faith,"' and a power to
award damages where none was expressed,"' or the use of past
practice to lend meaning to ambiguous contractual language ."'
Perhaps most frequent, yet virtually beyond demonstration, is the
selection by a labour board or arbitrator of a nuance of fact from
a jumble of evidence, or one particular meaning of an agreement or
statute from amongst several tenable meanings ."' This process lies
at the very heart of the act of decision-making, yet it is partly intuitive rather than purely rational. Above all, this informed intuition of industrial adjudicators sets their decisions apart from those
of the regular courts ; their decisions are vividly coloured by the
Westinghouse & Draftsmen's Association, Local 164 (1961) . 30 D.L.R .

(2d) 673 (Ont . C.A .) ("The Court has . . . to decide whether or not the
interpretation applied by the arbitrator is one which . . . the language of the
agreement reasonably will bear .")
'94
See e .g . R . v . O .L .R .B ., ex part,2 Trenton Construction Workers,
[19631 2 O.R . 376; R. v. Arthurs, ex parte Port Arthur Shipbuilding, supra
footnote 6, at p. 71 .
,ss Tung Sol of Canada Ltd. (1964), 15 L.A .C . 161 (Reville C.C.J .) .
iss
See e .g. Radio Lunch, [19501 C .C .H . L .L .R.P . 17,012 (O .L .R .B .) ;
Robert McAlpine Ltd ., [1961] Aug. Mthly. Rep. 178 (O.L .R .B.) .
'27
See e .g . Falconbridge Nickel Mines (1958), 8 L.A .C . 276 (Prof.
Laskin) ; National Cash Register ( 1966), 17 L.A .C . 67 (Reville C.C .J .) .
"e Polymer Corp . (1958), 10 L.A.C . 31,51 (Prof. Laskin), cent. denied
.sub . nom, Inrbleau v. Laskin, ex parte Polvrner Corp . (1961), 26 D.L .R .
(2d) 609 (Ont . H.C .) ; aff'd. (1961), 28 D.L.R . (2d) 81 (Ont . C.A .) ; aff'd.
[19621 S.C .R. 338,
12S
See e.g . Wellesley Hospital (1963), 14 L .A .C . 81 (Reville C.C.J .) :
Ernco Ltd . (1964), 15 L.A.C . 116 (Lang C.C.J .) .
... See e .g . Jarvis v. A .M .S ., [1964] S.C .R . 497, per Abbott J.. dissenting, at p. 506: "A board such as the Labour Relations Board, experienced in the field of labour management relations, representing both
organized labour, and the public, and presided over by a legally trained
chairman, ought to be at least as competent and as well suited to determine questions arising in the course of the administration of the Act as a
Superior Court judge." Cf. Bakery Workers v. White Lunch, [19661 S.C .R .
282, per Hall J., at p. 292-293 .
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facts, values, practices, policies and purposes of the industrial community .
Finally, it should be noted that compromise is a distinctive
characteristic of labour relations decision-making in two senses ; it
is both an adjunct of pure adjudication, and a central feature of it.
The collateral function of compromise is easily illustrated . Before seeking arbitration under a collective agreement, an employee
is required to substantially exhaust the possibilities of settlement by
resort to the grievance procedure;... before a formal hearing is convened on a complaint of illegal discrimination, whether because of
union affiliation or because of race or religion, attempts are made
to secure amicable settlement through the intervention of an officer
of the labour board,"' or the Human Rights Commission .. Even
where breaches of legislation may give rise to quasi-criminal proceedings, the consent of the labour board (or some administrative
officer) is interposed as a condition precedent to prosecution."' The
board's decision to give or withhold consent to prosecute is determined by its assessment of whether or not the statutory policy of
industrial peace will be advanced ; prosecution is not viewed as "a
manifestation of retributive justice" ."' Moreover, the consent application itself has been used as a means of educating the parties
in their rights and duties so that they will be able to resolve their
differences without recourse to law."' In a similar way, the labour
board may make declarations of illegal strikes or lockouts which
have no binding force, but which tend to produce voluntary compliance by the transgressor ."' The relative rarity of prosecution
testifies eloquently to the success of this policy of encouraging compromise.
As a value to be observed in the process of adjudication itself,
compromise is more difficult to identify and its proper limits are
"'See e.g . Labour Relations Act, R.S .O., 1960, c. 202, s. 34(2), which
stipulates a model arbitration clause for collective agreements which do
not contain one. The statutory clause provides for the submission of disputes to arbitration "after exhausting any grievance procedure" provided
by the agreement; see generally Toronto Parking Authority (1967), 17
L.A.C . 37 (Prof. Arthurs) .
... See e.g. Labour Relations Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c. 202, s. 65(2) ; R.S.B.C ., 1960, c. 205, s. 7(2) .
.. .Ontario Human Rights Code, S.O., 1961-2, c. 93, ss . 12, 13 .
..4 See e.g. Labour Relations Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c. 202, s. 74 ; R.S.B.C .,
1960, c. 202, s. 85 ; Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act,
R.S .C ., 1952, c. 152, s. 46 ; Ontario Human Rights Code, S.O ., 1961-2,
c. 93, s. 15 ; Labour Code, R.S .Q ., 1964, c. 141, s. 131.
... See e.g. Savage Shoes Ltd. (1953), 53
C.L.L.C . P.17,060 (O .L .R.B .) .
... See the remarks of the former chairman
of the Ontario Labour Rela
tions Board, 7. 1Finkelman, quoted in Bromke, op. cit., footnote 102, p. 93 .
137
See Arthurs, op . cit. footnote 10, at pp. 204-205, and cases cited.
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more difficult to define ."' Where an arbitrator, for example, is
charged with the duty of deciding upon alleged breaches of a collective agreement, he cannot ignore the agreement and foist upon
the parties an award premised solely upon considerations of fairness or good labour relations. Of course an award must be rooted
in the agreement. Yet within the limits of the contractual language,
the arbitrator may decide a case in a way which either contributes
to labour-management harmony, or detracts from it. Sometimes
the arbitrator's choice of language may be influenced by this consideration ; he may temper his criticism of rash management action
to minimize a debilitating "loss of face" for a foreman, or accept
management's interpretation of the agreement while warning against
potential abuses if that interpretation is carried to its logical limits .
Sometimes the arbitrator may apply a standard such as "just cause
for discharge" in a way which will vindicate an important employer
interest while avoiding excessive punishment for an employee; in
such a case, a discharge might be reduced to a suspension . Sometimes an arbitrator may choose one of two possibile interpretations
of an agreement because it seems most consonant with the balance
of power which the agreement embodies . In all of these situations,
compromise is an important makeweight .
The rationale of compromise as an adjudicative consideration
is found in the ongoing nature of the relationship between labour
and management. When the "litigation" is over, they must still live
together at least for the unexpired term of the collective agreement,
and likely for many years beyond it. A decision which ignores this
fact may do untold harm to the tranquility of this industrial community . Moreover, compromise is a function which the parties
themselves may intend the arbitrator to perform, within limits ; the
crisis atmosphere of collective bargaining, the unforeseeability of
events which may arise during a two or three year agreement, the
minutiae of working conditions for hundreds or thousands of
workers-all of these facts create temptations for the parties to
"paper over" their differences, and to rely upon the arbitrator when
and if controversy should arise ."' Indeed, this function o£ arbitration may be implicit in the typical statutory commandment that the
parties must provide in their collective agreement for "settlement"
. Carrothers, op . cit., footnote 105, p. 13 : "It may, however, be
"'Cf
noted that whereas compromise is often the essence of settlement of negotiation disputes, legal principles lie at the root of grievance disputes . Whatever an arbitrator does, his actions must not exceed the bounds of legal
validity."
... See e .g. Leather Cartage Ltd . (1965), 15 L.A.C. 291 (Prof Arthurs) .
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of their differences by arbitration ."'
Only the obvious remains to be stated : the regular courts do
not, and probably cannot, have regard to the effect of their decisions on the future relationship of litigants with each other, even
in the rare cases where parties to a contract are likely to be committed to a course of future dealing . Therefore, considerations of
compromise are not likely to affect a court's judgment in an ordinary contract case.
2. The Dole of the Common Law Courts.

The common law courts made their greatest contribution to
the development of an industrial jurisprudence by their refusal to
grapple with the problems of labour relations. As has been noted,
this refusal sometimes took the form of the application of inappropriate doctrines, but in at least one important area-enforcement
of the collective agreement-the courts simply declined to accept
jurisdiction at all. Ironically, Young v. C.ZV.IZ."' was a suit by an
employee on his personal employment contract (into which, he
alleged, the terms of the collective agreement were incorporated) so
that the court need not have taken any position on the enforceability of collective obligations . However, dicta in the case did
continue, for over thirty years, to deny judicial blessing to the
labour-management contract . Predictably, with the advent of legislation which encouraged the creation of these contracts, an extracurial, private system of enforcement was developed. Over the
years this private system, arbitration, began to emerge as an efficient and sophisticated process whose presence made court intervention virtually superfluous .
Then, by another and greater irony, the courts which had refused to enforce collective agreements when no other technique of
enforcement was available, began to entertain actions based upon
these agreements at the time when their assistance was least required . The origins of this development, its probable future course,
and its implications for industrial jurisprudence, must now be explored .
A line of cases, primarily in British Columbia, developed the
notion that the labour relations acts, in recognizing the existence
of collective agreements and in providing for their enforcement,
had impliedly rendered obsolete the former judicial antipathy to140 See e.g. Labour Relations Act, R.S.O ., 1960, c. 202, s. 34(1) ; R.S .B.C ., 1960, c. 205, s. 22(1)(b) ; Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 152, s. 19(1).
"" Supra, footnote 100.
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wards them."' These cases conferred upon the parties to the agreement a right to seek either a declaration or an injunction-but not
damages-in the event of breach . Subsequently, in Manitoba,
legislation"' was enacted to clearly establish the right of the courts
to award damages for breach of the agreement to either party or to
any person bound by the, agreement or to anyone injured by, or
suffering damage as the result of, the breach . However, neither the
cases referred to, nor the statute, expressly advert to two critical
problems : first, is an aggrieved party entirely free to seek redress
through the courts rather than through arbitration? and, second, if
so, from what source is the court to derive the law which it applies
in deciding whether the agreement has been violated?
The former question, in a sense, was impliedly answered by
the statute referred to; presumably if resort to arbitration was to be
compelled, there would have been no point in creating a new cause
of action enforceable in the courts . Contrariwise, legislation in
Ontario and Saskatchewan"' appears to preclude any inference
that statutory "recognition" of the collective agreement invites its
judicial enforcement . Apart from these statutes, however, the
likelihood is that the regular courts will increasingly entertain
actions seeking relief for breaches of collective agreements, despite
the fact that arbitration boards can give equally effective remedies .
What effect does the availability of the common law action
have upon the rights of the industrial citizen? In one sense, the
individual employee's situation is affected not at all ; he is not a
party to the union-management contract, and therefore has no
status to sue on it.'45 In another sense, however. the repercussions
are substantial . The court's decision may profoundly affect his
wages and working conditions by laying down the rules of the
shop ; a decision that the union is answerable in damages for a
breach may sap its resources and undermine its ability to advance
the employees' interests . But these results, however dramatic, strike
the employee only on the ricochet . The critical question is whether
"~ See Southin, The Collective Agreement as the Subject of a Civil
Action (1958), 2 U.B .C . Leg. Not. 57 1 ; Sherbaniuk, op . cit., footnote 53 ;
Adell, The Legal Status of Collective Agreements in England, the United
States and Canada, (unpublished Ph .D . thesis, Oxford, 1966) .
"' Labour Relations Act, R.S .M ., 1952, c. 132, as amended by S.M .,
1962, c. 35, s. 46A(2) ; see also Trade-Unions Act, R.S.B .C ., 1960, c. 384,
s. 4.
"' Rights of Labour Act, R.S .O ., 1960, c. 354, s. 3; Trade Union Act,
R.S.S ., 1965, c. 287, s. 27 .
"5 At common law, the ordinary citizen was likewise unable to enforce
community norms expressed in legislation and municipal by-laws, see Orpen
v. Roberts, [19251 S.C.R . 364, a doctrine now partially displaced by the
Municipal Act, R.S .O ., 1960, c. 249, s. 486.
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he may sue and be sued in a common law court in respect of
rights and duties arising under a collective agreement. Recent
cases indicate an affirmative answer .
The measure of the employee's common law rights is, of
course, his contract of employment. At least since 1959, it has
been clear that an employee's contract of employment cannot be
inconsistent with the provisions of the collective agreement."'
From this conclusion, the courts moved easily to the view that
the terms of the individual employment contract incorporated the
provisions of the collective agreement, so that the employee could
sue"' or be sued"' in the regular courts without regard to the
problem of whether the collective agreement was to be enforced
exclusively through arbitration . This movement outflanked three
serious obstacles to suit, one of them factual and two legal.
The factual obstacle is the non-existence of the employment contract in modern industry. By inferring a personal contract, and by
borrowing its terms from the collective agreement, awkward problems of proving the invisible are avoided. The legal obstacles are
the employee's status as a third-party beneficiary of the collective.
agreement, and the decision in Young v. C.N.R . The former consideration becomes irrelevant because the action is brought on
the personal contract ; as to the latter, the Young case is simply
written off as a victim of the onward march of legal technology .
Finally, in deference to the special legislation in Ontario and Saskatchewan, the action is not brought "on a collective agreement",
but rather on an employment contract .
Yet nagging questions persist. If the employee has unsuccessfully attempted to pursue his remedies before the industrial tribunal, is it fair that he should be allowed to relitigate his case in
the regular courts? If the substantive provisions of the collective
agreement are incorporated into the contract of employment, why
not the procedural provisions as well? If the "common law" of
industry is to develop from a series of decisions by arbitrators,
how can continuity of growth be ensured, and the possible incongruity of a decision by an external court be avoided? All of these
questions might have been answered simultaneously by forcing the
employee to seek redress exclusively before industrial tribunals.
However, the courts have chosen instead to work out a rather
"Le Syndicat Catholique v. Cie. Paquet, [1959] S .C.R . 206.
'4' Grottoli v . Lock, [19631 2 O.R. 254, aff'd in C .A . (unreported) .
"'Nelson Laundries v . Manning (1965), 51 D.L.R . (2d) 537 (B .S .S .C.) .
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complex accommodation between their jurisdiction and that of
their counterparts in industry .
Expressed in policy terms, the courts' basic premise is that
union control of acess to arbitration"' will place the rights of individual employees in jeopardy."' Assuming that this fear is well
founded and that no other adequate safeguard exists,"' the courts
have really never come to grips with the problems created by permitting litigants a choice of forums .
In one case, the court observed that the employee "although
he was not bound to do so" had elected to go to arbitration, and
that he was therefore precluded from attacking an unfavourable
award by means of an action in the regular courts alleging breach
of his employment contract.'s2 In another case, the court suggested that had the employee elected to pursue arbitration, he
could not have brought an action at common law for wrongful dismissal ."' But apart from the easy cases where an employee seeking
to relitigate his case can be forestalled by a plea of estoppel or
election,"' there is little discussion of the hard cases where an
employee is driven to the common law court because he cannot
obtain relief in any other way. For example, in one case a grievance
was time-barred, and arbitration was impossible ; suit was permitted without comment on this point."' In another case, the
union agreed that the grievance was without merit and abandoned
it prior to arbitration ; the court gave relief, but "reserved" for
future determination the question of whether "mere invocation"
of the grievance procedure constitutes an election of remedies."'
Only in a passing comment in a Quebec case did a court suggest
that an employee's ability to invoke the aid of a common law
court might depend on whether his union was prosecuting his
claim "in good faith" ."'
149
See Hoogendoorn v . Greening Metal Products, supra, footnote 81
and R . v . Ottawa, ex parte Bradley, supra, footnote 80 ; see also Laskin,
op . cit., footnote 82 .
151 See e .g. Grottoli v. Lock, supra, footnote 147, at pp . 255-256, per
McRuer, C .J .H.C . ; Miramichi Hospital v . Woods, supra, footnote 80, at
pp. 295-296, per Bridges C .J .N .B .
rsr See supra, Section 11 3(b), The Union as a Bargaining Agency.
''= Canadian Car & Foundry v . Dinhanz, supra, footnote 89 .
lss Miramichi Hospital v . Woods, supra, footnote 79 .
1 .54
See e .g. Caven v . C.P .R ., [1925] 3 D .L.R . 841 (P .C .)-, Layne v . Pullrnart, [1955] O.W .N . 219 ; Canadian Car & Foundry v . Dinhant . supra, footnote 89 .
"s Grottoli v. Lock, supra, footnote 147 .
. . . Crossinan v . Peterborough (1966), 58 D .L.R. (2d) 218 (Ont . C.A.) .
16'
Bisson v. Bra. Railway Carmen (1962), 63 C .L .L .C . P .15,469 (Que.
Sup . CQ .
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Apart from cases involving the election of remedies, the courts
have shown no consistent inclination to avoid suits by individual
employees seeking protection against alleged employer violations .
In several cases, it is true, the courts declined to issue temporary
injunctions which would preserve existing working conditions until
the legality of a proposed change was tested by an arbitrator ."'
Here the courts seemed to be responding to the traditional doctrine that temporary injunctions should be sparingly given, rather
than (or in addition to) any considerations of jurisdictional propriety . In only one case has a court forthrightly declined jurisdiction in favour of an arbitration board, holding that it was "precluded . . . by the terms of the Labour Relations Act" from embarking upon an interpretation of the collective agreement."' The
Supreme Court of Canada, too, has indicated that interpretation
of the collective agreement lies within the exclusive power of industrial decision-makers, although the courts may award damages
where no question of interpretation arises ."' As seen by a later
court's. this decision makes an interpretative award a "condition
precedent" to suit."'
This distinction between issues of interpretation (which the
courts will avoid) and issues of enforcement (which the courts will
entertain) may not be entirely clear-cut. For example, the issue of
whether an employee has been discharged "for cause", as specified
by the agreement, only tangentially involves interpretation, yet it is
much more than mere enforcement. Clearly this should remain
within the exclusive control of industrial adjudicators,"' yet the
courts have several times heard actions for wrongful dismissal on
the merits ."' Similarly, the question of a union's liability for an
admitted violation of a no-strike clause might seem to be solely
a problem of remedy but it penetrates to the heart of the unionas Cummings v. H.E.P .C., [1966] 1 O .R. 605 ; Shank v . K.V.P., [19661
2 O .R . 847 ; Canada Steamships v . S .I.U . (1966), 66 C .L .L .C. P .14,155
(Que. C .A .) ; Caveney v . deHavilland Aircraft (1963), 64 C.L.L.C . P.15,494
(Ont . C .A .) .
. .. Close v. Globe & Mail, supra, footnote 87 .
. .. Hamilton Street Railway v. Northcott, [19671 S .C.R .
3.
161R . v . Fuller, ex parte Earles, supra, footnote 40 .
a' To the same effect see Cité de Jacques Cartier v. Tanquay (1965),
66 C .L .L .C. P .14,121 (Que . C.A .) ; and see contra I.C .W.U. v . Consumers' Gas (1963), 41 D .L.R. (2d) 119 (Ont. H .C.), where a "union
sought an injunction to enforce an arbitration award, which was refused
on the ground that the Labour Relations Act provided a statutory scheme
of enforcement.
. .. See R . v . Arthurs, ex parte Port Arthur Shipbuilding, supra, footnote 6 .
.s4 See e .g . Miramichi Hospital v. Woods, supra, footnote
79 ; Crossman
v . Peterborough, supra, footnote 156 .
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management relationship and dramatizes the arbitrator's essential
functions."'
Given the courts' obvious reluctance to yield jurisdiction entirely, the interpretation-remedy distinction does open the door to
fruitful speculation on a question posed earlier: from what source
should the court derive the law which it will apply when industrial
litigation comes before it? The question may arise in a variety of
situations . The court may be asked to review the decision of a labour board or arbitrator in certiorari proceedings ; an application
for an injunction may be premised on the illegality of conduct allegedly proscribed by the labour relations Act ; as indicated earlier,
an action based upon an individual's contract of employment may
well involve analysis of the terms of a collective agreement. In all
of these situations, the court may, if it wishes, defer to the system
of jurisprudence developed within the industrial community and
apply the "law" of that system rather than the conventional legal
doctrines administered by the courts . Such an approach can be
justified on the basis of both precedent and policy .
In terms of precedent, we should not forget that modern commercial law owes its origins to the "law merchant" developed by
the private arbitral courts of the trading community. As with in
dustrial jurisprudence, the law merchant developed as a reaction
to the failure of the common law to provide substantive, evidentiary, and procedural rules suitable for litigation between the parties
to various commercial transactions . Only with Lord Mansfield's
attempts to integrate the law merchant into the common law could
it be said that the regular courts were the appropriate forum far
such litigation . A distinguished American observer, recognizing the
inevitability of judicial involvement in industrial litigation, has
speculated that,
. . . perhaps some modern Mansfield might turn this industrial juris-

prudence into a body of law governing judicial interpretation and enforcements of collective-bargaining agreements .156

Perhaps equally compelling, and more contemporary, is the familiar
practice of our courts in dealing with contracts made in another
jurisdiction . Once it is determined that the "proper law of the contract" is foreign law, the substantive rules of the forum no longer
apply. Subject of course to the adequacy of proof, our courts have
"' See linbleau v. Laskin, ex parte Polymer, supra, footnote 128 ; Palmer,
Remedial Authority of Labour Arbitrators (1960), 1 Curr. Law & Soc.
Prob . 125 ; Arthurs, op. cit., footnote 10 .
"' Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration (1959), 72 Harv . L. Rev.
1482, at p. 1483 .
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little hestitation in deciding the case on the basis of the doctrines
of another legal system . Once the industrial community and its
legal system is recognized as a "foreign" jurisdiction, the courts
should likewise apply industrial law rather than common law in
deciding controversies involving labour and management ."'
In policy terms, the arguments for the application by the courts
of principles of industrial law seem overwhelming, when set against
the contrary consideration of uniformity for its own sake . In large
part, these arguments have already been canvassed . The distinctive
characteristics of industrial decision-makers and of their decisions
have developed in the context of, and in response to, statutes, agreements, policies and practices, which represent an accommodation
between labour and management and community interests. This
accommodation is an evolutionary one, and seems to be developing in the direction of an authentic and integrated code of industrial citizenship . This growth should therefore not be inhibited
by the introduction of extraneous and inappropriate doctrines, nor
should its administration be confused by holding out to litigants
the prospect of obtaining a different result in the regular courts
than they might obtain by staying within the industrial system ."'
A final consideration, perhaps the most important one, is the present reputation of the regular courts within the community of labour
and management . In the eyes of labour, the judges are enemies and
the law is a weapon of oppression; in management's view, the
courts are a last line of defence against labour's irresponsibility .
However distorted these images may be, the courts must be rescued
from the partisan role to which they have been assigned . By educating themselves in the living tradition of the industrial community,
and by accepting the legitimacy of its values, the courts can perhaps retrieve the lost opportunites of the period during which industrial jurisprudence was coming of age.
IUT. Conclusion.
The characteristics of "industrial citizenship" seem to be emerging,
almost accidentally, as the result of legislation, customs, administrative decisions and consensual arrangements which form the
16' See e.g. Re Gainers, supra, footnote 111, and R . v. Arthurs, ex parte
Port Arthur Shipbuilding, supra, footnote 6, per Wells J.A., at p. 60, per
Laskin J .A ., at pp. 69-70,
"'See Adell, Note, Labour Law-Collective Agreement-Right of Individual Employee to Sue Employer (1967), 45 Can . Bar Rev. 354, Holot,
The Collective Labour Agreement and its Enforcement (1967), 5 Alta
L. Rev. 274 .
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pattern of rights and duties within which the Canadian worker
exists. This pattern is kaleidoscopic : it is composed of a jumble of
diffuse and jagged parts, and its symmetry is a thing of the moment .
As social and industrial problems increasingly engage the attention of Canadian lawyers, and labour relations specialists, they
will no doubt continue to develop solutions to them on an ad hoc
basis. But the challenge of industrial citizenship is that it invites a
coherent and integrated approach to these problems . This approach
will require imagination and energy as those within the world of
industry begin to forge a code of citizenship . It will also require
restraint on the part of judges and lawmakers who must maintain
an atmosphere in which responsible industrial self-government can
develop .

